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Cognitive Competence in Executive-Branch Decision

Making
ANNA SPAIN BRADLEY
The decisions Presidents and those operating under their authority take
determine the course of our nation and the trajectoryof our lives. Consequently,
understandingwho has the power and authority to decide has captured both the
attention of legal scholars across a variety of fields for many years and the
immediate worry of the public since the 2016 Presidential election. Prevailing
interventionslook for ways that law can offer proceduraland institutionalreforms
that aim to maintain separationof powers and avoid an authoritarianregime. Yet,
these views commonly overlook a fundamentalfactor and a more human one: the
individuals empowered to make choices on behalf of the nation. In governance,
sometimes the problem is legal or institutional. But sometimes a person is the
problem.
Taking up this view, this Article investigates how legal scholarshipcan expand
its understanding of executive-branch decision making by adapting insightsfrom
neuroscience about how human cognition works. Individuals matter because every
instance of executive-branch overreach can be located in a particular decision
taken by a specific person. Attending to cognitive functions associated with
individualjudgment and choice offers a new way of understandinggovernmental
decision making by broadeningunderstandingofthe government's decision makers.
The key to promoting effective governance, this Article argues, requires renovating
how the law understands individual choice and determines who should have the
legal authority to make decisions that affect the nation. Adopting a
neuroscientifically informedperspective on decision making both produces a more
accurate, descriptive understanding of how executive-branch decisions are made
and destabilizes existingpresumptions that a person is qualified to make decisions
ofnational importancesolely because she or he is legally authorized(appointedor
otherwise selected) to do so. Who decides matters because, in the end, the difference
between good and bad governance often comes down to the choices made by the
people who are in charge.
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Cognitive Competence in Executive-Branch Decision
Making
ANNA SPAIN BRADLEY'
INTRODUCTION

The Constitution sets out just three requirements-concerning age,
citizenship, and residency-that an individual must meet to be eligible to
serve as President of the United States.' The law does not concern itself with
whether the President is of sound mind or has a record of competent decision
making.2 Of course, making good decisions is central to the role that the
leader of our nation and the commander-in-chief of our military serves. This
lack of legal oversight concerning presidential eligibility is even more
striking given the expansive-and expanding-powers that Presidents
exercise.3 In 1917, President Woodrow Wilson described the Office of the
President by saying, "[h]is office is anything he has the sagacity and force
to make it."4 When asked in 1977 if the President can decide to do something
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. My gratitude and thanks to Daniel
Abebe, Fred Bloom, Adam Bradley, Harold Bruff, McKell Carston, Jean Galbraith, Peter Huang,
Rebecca Ingber, Sarah Krakoff, Jeremy Lack, Doug Noll, Helen Norton, Samuel Rascoff, Pierre Schlag,
Ganesh Sitaraman, and participants at the University of Wisconsin School of Law's Global Legal Studies
Speaker Series, the SMU Dedman Law School Faculty Forum, the University of Colorado Law School's
Works-in-Progress Series, and the University of Colorado Law School's Conference on Mindfulness for
helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts. I am grateful to Associate Professor and Director
of the Sciences Department Jack Maness of the University of Colorado, and Associate Director of Faculty
Research Jane Thompson and Matt Zafiratos of the University of Colorado Law School Library for
outstanding research support. Finally, I thank Denis O'Malley and the editors of the Connecticut Law
Review for their outstanding editing services.
'U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
2The President does undertake an oath to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S.
CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 7 & § 3; see Harold H. Bruff, The President's Faithful Execution Duty, 87 UNIV.
COLO. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2016) (providing historical and legal analysis about what the oath has meant
over time). There are informal principles and norms about presidential eligibility. See, e.g., Charles
Gordon, Who Can Be Presidentofthe United States: The UnresolvedEnigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1, 1 (1968)
(discussing the question of presidential eligibility); Randall Kennedy, A NaturalAristocracy?, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 175, 176 (1995) ("All citizens of the United States should have an equal legal right to vie for
the Nation's highest office[.]"); Jordan Steiker et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously:
ConstitutionalInterpretationand the Crisisof PresidentialEligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237, 241 (1995)

(envisioning a broader category of citizens of the United States who are eligible for the presidency).
3 See HAROLD H. BRUFF, UNTRODDEN GROUND 333 (2015) (providing rich analysis of how
Presidents have interpreted the Constitution in ways that expand their authority); see also David Brain
Robertson, HistoricalInstitutionalism, Political Development, and the Study ofAmerican Bureaucracy,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 29 (Robert F. Durant ed. 2010) ("On all sides,

scholars and political actors began to speculate that the state and its administrators acted more
independently of society than had been thought.").
4 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 (1961).
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illegal, President Richard Nixon responded by saying "[w]ell, when the
president does it that means it is not illegal."' Speaking to congressional
leadership in 2000, then President-elect George W. Bush quipped "[i]f this
were a dictatorship, it'd be a heck of a lot easier, just so long as I'm the
dictator." 6 Newly elected President Donald Trump has asserted grandiose
claims to the power he can wield as President. Presidential power is made
manifest in the choices they make.'
One of the ways that Presidents exercise choice is in their appointment
and selection of the hundreds of advisers, White House officials, and
political appointees that accompany any administration. Presidents are
presumed to select people who are competent and highly qualified to do the
job, whether in a Cabinet position or as a policy czar. Here, there is little
oversight by Congress, outside of the Appointments Clause, governing
whom the President hires into his or her administration. And within that
constitutional framework, there is no requirement that measures whether
such people are also competent, in the cognitive sense, to serve. In reality,
many posts, especially the coveted Secretary of State position, are given to
those who have been politically loyal to the President.o
Scholars evaluate presidential powers and are concerned with the
excessive exercise of those powers because it threatens the Madisonian
principle of separation of powers so essential to our democracy."
sIn an interview televised on May 19, 1977, David Frost said,
If the President, if, for example, the President approves something, approves an action
because of the national security or, in this case, because of a threat to internal peace
and order of significant magnitude, then the President's decision in that instance is

one that enables those who carry it out, to carry it out without violating a law.
DAVID FROST, "I GAVE THEM A SWORD": BEHIND THE SCENES OF THE NIXON INTERVIEWS 164 (1978).
6 Transition of Power: President-ElectBush Meets with Congressional Leaders on Capitol Hill,

CNN, http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0012/18/nd.01.html
visited Nov. 26, 2016).

[https://perma.cc/ZVL8-X54Z] (last

7 Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States, Exec. Order No.

13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-orders/donaldtrump/2017 [https://www.federalregister.gov/d/2017-02281] See, e.g., Marc Fisher, Donald Trump and
the
Expanding
Power
of the
Presidency,
WASH.
POST
(July
30,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/donald-trump-and-the-dangers-of-a-strongpresidency/2016/07/30/69cfc686-55be-lIe6-b7de-dfe5O943c39_story.html
[https://perma.cc/9GAEMUWV] ("Trump's idea that 't alone can fix this' does go beyond the template that President Obama
and President Bush before him came in with, the idea that you try to fix things together .... ).
8 MICHAEL J. GLENNON,

CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 164 (1990)

(arguing that the core

presidential power is negotiation).
9 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 3.
"o George C. Edwards III, Why Not the Best? The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Presidential
Appointments, BROOKINGS (Mar. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edularticles/why-not-the-best-theloyalty-competence-trade-off-in-presidential-appointments/ [https://perma.cc/9P5U-8JXW].
" See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(discussing the need for government to be structured in a manner that provides proper checks and
balances); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition oftyranny."); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38 (1952)
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Understanding what our laws permit a President to do under various
circumstances has captured scholarly attention for decades.12 There are
proposals about how law can constrain such power through legal reform and
institutional design.13 We find examinations of if and how international law
can alter the course of presidential powers. 14 Debates ensue over when direct
presidential control is optimal and when delegation of responsibility to other
actors in the executive branch is warranted." Much of the concern is over
who gets to decide and the role of law in evaluating such delegation.' 6 As
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.... Presidential claim
to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is
the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."). For views critical of the validity and tenacity
of Madisonian-based understandings of separation of powers, see Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule,
Essay, Delegatingto Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 2193, 2204-05 (2012) (arguing that separation of
powers problems arise because of inter-branch agreement); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes,
Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2316 (2006) (analyzing separation of
powers through the frame of party-competition).
12 For authors tracing the expansion of presidential power over time and analyzing the
consequences, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL ALARMISM: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE

AMERICAN REPUBLIC 6 ("emphasizing the danger of a runaway presidency") (2010); HAROLD H. BRUFF,
BAD ADVICE: BUSH'S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 289-90 (2009) (arguing that Congress should

be more vigilant in its oversight of the executive branch); JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT:
THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 25-27 (2012) (identifying structural constraints to the
President's capacity to alter national security positions); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:
LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 215-16 (2007) (arguing that the threat of

terrorists groups will result in the presidency assuming more power and needing more democratic
accountability); RICHARD NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY (1983); ARTHUR SCHLESINGER

JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); see also Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 2245, 2249 (2001) ("Where once presidential supervision had worked to dilute or delay
regulatory initiatives, it served in the Clinton years as part of a distinctly activist and pro-regulatory
governing agenda."); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994) ("Any faithful reader of history must conclude that the unitary executive,
conceived in the foregoing way, is just myth."); Trevor W. Morrison, ConstitutionalAvoidance in the
Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (2006) ("provid[ing] the analytical tools for
evaluating executive uses of the avoidance canon.").
" See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1565 (2007) (examining executive-branch legal interpretation); Neal
Kuman Katyal, InternalSeparationofPowers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branchfrom Within,
115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006) (proposing reforms to the unitary executive that allow for internal
checks and balances); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120
YALE L.J. 1032, 1059 (2011) ("[E]mphasiz[ing] that 'agencies' are not unitary actors and can be
internally fractured in a de facto sense.").
14 Rebecca lngber, InternationalLaw Constraintsas Executive Power, 57 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 109
(2016) ("[T]here are a number of critical areas where the Executive acts unilaterally, even secretly, and
due to some mix of judicial and congressional abdication or ignorance there is little to no room for
intervention.").
" See Samuel J. Rascoff, Presidentiallntelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 637 (2016) (arguing
that the President should execute direct control over the realm of intelligence gathering); Matthew C.
Waxman, Police and NationalSecurity: American Local Law Enforcementand Counter-TerrorismAfter
9/11, 3 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 377, 378 (2009) (arguing that the overwhelming scholarly
attention focused on federal national security law overlooks the legal debates playing out at a local level).
'6 Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1417, 1425 (2012) ("[T]oday's security
concept .. . shapes current discussions of threat and foreign policy in ways that often inhibit rather than
promote actual security.").
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Justice Jackson expressed in his concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet
Tube Co. v. Sawyer,1 7 the central concern stems from executive action that
"originates in the individual will of the President and represents an exercise
of authority without law."' 8
But these legal interventions into presidential power often overlook a
fundamental factor and a human one: the people empowered to make
decisions within the executive branch on the President's behalf. In
governance, sometimes the problem is legal or institutional. But sometimes
a person is the problem.19 Every instance of executive-branch overreach is
rooted in a particular decision taken by a particular person (or group of
people). When a President or his administration blunders, it occurs at the
hands of an individual or set of individuals who made the wrong choice. But
the law rarely intervenes into the cognitive competencies that influence an
individual's capacity for effective decision making.
This Article argues that it should. To do so, the Article develops the
connection between executive-branch decision making and the individuals
responsible for deciding.20 I use insights from neuroscience to describe
cognitive competence2 1 in decision making. I then explore several
monumental and well-known executive-branch decision moments (e.g.,
torture, targeted killing, and the use of atomic bombs) to expose how
considerations beyond facts and law, such as emotion or empathy, can
influence executive-branch decision makers. I introduce neuroscientific
studies that explore and explain why these considerations matter in human
cognition associated with decision making in ways that law has yet to
appreciate.
The central claim is that understanding cognitive competence is
essential to understanding general decision-making competence. The Article
supports this view by deepening descriptive understandings about how
individual choice shapes executive-branch governance far more than
previously acknowledged. This humanization of governmental decision
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
" Id at 655 ("No one, perhaps not even the President, knows the limits of the power he may seek
to exert in this instance and the parties affected cannot learn the limit of their rights.").
' See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, Remembering Why Americans Loathe Dick Cheney, ATLANTIC

(Aug. 30, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/08/remembering-why-americansloathe-dick-cheney/244306/ [https://perma.cc/ZXS2-9THX] (discussing how Vice President Dick
Cheney's performance in office was widely criticized).
20 This Article investigates how neuroscience can inform law and decision making. The focus on
process necessarily requires contextualization, and the context here is executive-branch decision making.
In doing so, this Article ranges widely over several substantive legal areas, including constitutional law,
administrative law, national security law, and international law.
21

e term "cognitive competence," as used here, refers to the capacity for appropriate brain-based

processes invoked in decision making functions. These include memory, perception, choice, judgment,
executive function, capacity to plan, foresight, problem solving, empathy, emotion, self-understanding
through reflection, and switching between directional and abstract thought. Cognitive competencies are
a part of a broader set of decision making competencies that may include criteria like expertise, education,
knowledge, etc.
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making aims to prompt scholars to engage the implications of human
cognition in their investigations into presidential powers and executive
branch reform.
The Article offers two signal contributions. First, it introduces how
neuroscientific insights can enrich traditional understandings about
government decision making.22 In doing so, this Article advances a novel
neurolaw addition to legal scholarship on presidential power and executivebranch decision making.23 The neuroscience helps explain what the
behavioral sciences observe: that human decision making is complex and
people often make poor choices.24 Such findings further advance earlier

22

Scholarship on government decision making is heavily influenced by rational choice theory. See

PAUL BREST & LINDA HAMILTON KRIEGER, PROBLEM SOLVING, DECISION MAKING, AND
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND POLICYMAKERs 366 (2010) ("People are in

principle capable of pursuing their ends-whatever they may be-in a rational manner."); ALEX MINTZ
& CARLY WAYNE, THE POLYTHINK SYNDROME 3 (2016) (describing ways in which "rational decision
makers engage in flawed decision making process that deeply affect the security and welfare of a
country"). But see Gregory M. Herek et al., Decision Making DuringInternationalCrises, 31 J. CONF.
RES. 203, 203-04 (1987) (explaining why rational choice theory is descriptively and normatively
inadequate for improving the quality of decisions). For rationalist approaches of executive-branch
decision making in the context of War Powers see, e.g., Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and
Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L. J. 2512 (2006). But see Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Essay,
IrrationalWar and ConstitutionalDesign: A Reply to ProfessorsNzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1239 (2006).
23 This is one of, if not the first article to apply insights from neuroscience to decision making in
the executive-branch context. For a comprehensive list of the nascent legal scholarship engaging
cognitive neuroscience in tort, criminal law, and other areas, see infra Section II.
2 See infra note 136 and accompanying text (providing a literature review of individual
neuroscientific studies that support this general insight); For behavioral approaches to decision making
see RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,

WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 66 (2008) (claiming that desirable behavior can be increased by drawing
public attention to what others are doing); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1, 5-6 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (presenting various rational choice models and
explaining that people are displeased with losses); Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1471, 1473-75 (1998) (explaining that the field of economics
may be undermined because humans do not always make rational economic choices); Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralScience: Removing the RationalityAssumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1074-75 (2000) (asserting that scholars of law and
behavioral science seek to understand why individuals sometimes behave irrationally in their decision
making). For the limited body of legal scholarship beginning to engage behavioral psychology and
behavioral economics in the realm of government decision making, see Ganesh Sitaraman & David
Zionts, Behavioral War Powers, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 516, 521-23 (2015) (applying insights from
behavioral psychology to the legal debate on presidential war powers). For international legal scholarship
in this area, see Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understandingof Treaty Design,
53 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 310, 312, 356 (2013) (discussing the link between individual cognitive errors and
state-decision errors in consenting to treaties and arguing that international legal actors should
incorporate insights from choice architecture into their decision making); Ryan Goodman et al.,
Introduction: Social Science and Human Rights, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING

HUMAN RIGHTS 6-7, 16-17 (Ryan Goodman et al. eds., 2012) (describing the new research in empirical
economics and social psychology); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51
HARV. INT'L L.J. 51, 52-56 (2010) (investigating the implications of recent behavioral insights, including
behavioral economics, on the international human rights regime today); Anne van Aaken, Comment,
Towards Behavioral InternationalLaw and Economics, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 47-49, 57-59 (2008)
(describing the influence of the Law and Economics movements on international law).
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investigations into decision making that go beyond rational choice theory.25
The Article's second contribution is its most destabilizing. By opening
up the descriptive understanding of decision making at the individual level,
this Article calls for sustained investigation into what decision-making
competencies, cognitive and otherwise, are desirable and optimal for
particular positions. It argues that cognitive competence should become a
component of the broader set of competencies considered in authorizing a
person to hold a powerful executive-branch post. This, in turn, challenges
traditional practices about who is deemed eligible and how people are
selected. Assuming that executive officials are competent to hold a given
position based solely on the President's appointment, the Senate's approval,
or an unspecified sense of exceptionalism derived from one's education,
pedigree, or special access to knowledge, is not good enough.
Take the position of National Security Advisor, for example. Since
1947, forty-seven individuals have served in this important post. What
qualifies them to do so? Prior practice suggests that an Ivy League education
and military experience is key.26 But prior practice also suggests that being
a white male matters, given that all but three NSAs share this identity.27
However, there is no sustained inquiry into how these criteria predict
optimal performance for those who have served. Instead, their competence
to do the job of NSA is assumed. Making such assumptions is inadequate
given the power that such an individual can wield. This Article invokes
neuroscience to prompt legal scholars and political leaders to think more
critically about what set of competencies are necessary to thrive as a top
executive-branch decision maker. It also calls for further scholarly
consideration about how law can better inform who is selected to decide.
The application of neuroscientific studies to legal scholarship requires
care and restraint. Accordingly, the following contextualization applies.28
25 See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS

AND FIASCOS (1982) (setting forth the argument that the quality of the decision making process
influences the quality of the decisions made in the foreign-policy context); BEYOND GROUPTHINK:
POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING (Paul't Hart, Eric K. Stem, & Bengt Sundelius
eds., 1997); DOMINIC JOHNSON, OVERCONFIDENCE AND WAR: THE HAVOC AND GLORY OF POSITIVE

ILLUSIONS 5 (2004) (arguing that overconfidence is an adaptive trait of human evolutionary biology and
a contributing factor of war)..
26 See infra Section I.C.
2

See infra Section IC for chart.

See infra Section II.A for additional information. Neuroscientists are cautionary about their
findings on two fronts relevant to this Article. First, they aim to make claims consistent with what the
state of the current science supports. Second, they aim for a predictive quality, that is, to make claims
that will continue to be consistent with future data. This Article aims to achieve the first standard but
humbly leaves the second aim to the neuroscientists. The Article acknowledges limitations in using brain
data to make claims about mental and cognitive capacities. See, e.g., Russell A. Poldrack, Can Cognitive
28

Processes Be Inferredfrom Neuroimaging Data?, 10 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 59, 59, 62 (2006)

(describing the limitations on the "reverse inference" practice, which is a functional neuroimaging
technique used to understand better the nature of cognition). For an overview of scholarship at the
intersection of law and neuroscience, see MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS,
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The claims I extend are based on studies in cognitive neuroscience that
analyze the relationship between the brain's physical structure and its mental
processes that influence decision making-such as memory, emotion, and
empathy. 29 I utilize findings that have received wide support in their subfields and have been verified by multiple studies using a variety of imaging
approaches. 30 I then posit what such insights might mean for decision makers
in the government context. Neuroscientific studies have revealed important
knowledge about what can occur in the brain during decision making. These
studies shed light on how a brain works but not on how all brains work, or
on how groups work together. Throughout the Article, I assume that
increased understanding about how the brain functions in making decisions
is normatively positive. I further assume that this increased understanding
will optimize the capacity to make better choices. 3 1In keeping within these
constraints, the Article's aim is not to propose specific prescriptions but to
demonstrate the value of further study at the intersection of law,
neuroscience, and decision making.
The Article is organized as follows. Section I frames the central concern
to which the Article responds-that the legal authorization for selecting
executive-branch decision makers does not account for decision-making
competency. Instead, the Senate or the President may presume a person is
competent based on factors that are not, on their own, good indicators of
decision-making competence, such as education or a prior personal
relationship. Section II contrasts these views with modem evidence from
neuroscience that explains why people, and therefore why executive-branch
decision makers, are prone to be influenced by emotion, empathy, and bias
in ways that influence cognition and may lead to poor choices. It also
describes cognitive complexities of decision making not presently accounted
for by legal understandings. Section III considers the barriers that
neuroscience is up against by tracing the historical reliance in American
legal thought on concepts of rationality, meritocracy, and exceptionalism as
markers of decision-making competence. Section IV considers the broader
AND LAW: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 47-78 (2013) (discussing

neuroscience and legal theory).

29 See generally MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF

THE MIND (3d ed. 2009) (providing a general overview of the field).
30

See,

e.g.,

NEUROSYNTH,

http://neurosynth.org/analyses/terms/executive%20control//

[https://perma.cc/X3SK-VQ32] (last visited Dec. 30, 2016). Neurosynth is a platform for accessing data
from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies. For example, a search on Executive Control
provides data on automated meta-analysis of 157 studies of executive functions of the brain that present
as images with reverse or forward inferences. See Interview with R. McKell Carston, Assistant Professor
of Psychology and Neuroscience, Univ. of Colo. (Jan. 19, 2016) (describing Nuerosynth: "Reverse
inference says approximately: if I was handed a map with activation here what would kind of experiment
did it likely come from? Forward inference says approximately: if I did an experiment on executive
function where would I be likely to find activation? The difference is between inferring mental processes
from activation (reverse) and having a reliable idea of what activations a given experiment will
produce.").
31 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN & REID HASTIE, WISER: GETTING BEYOND GROUPTHINK

TO MAKE GROUPS SMARTER (2014) (making the same assumption).
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implications of these findings. It calls for developing a richer descriptive
account of how decision making works to understand how individuals
motivate decisions adopted within the executive branch. It offers two
hypotheticals that map neuroscientific insights about what happens inside
our brains onto real examples of executive-branch decision making. This
supports the Article's qualified normative argument that neuroscience ought
to inform the selection of critical government decision makers and the
legitimization of those individuals chosen under the law. This query into
law's conceptualization of competence upsets accepted presumptions in
order to advance the cultivation of better decision makers and of better
government.
I. EXECUTIVE-BRANCH DECISION MAKERS

The study of American governance is also a study of decision making.
Law derived from our Constitution provides the decision-making
labyrinth-it structures who gets to decide according to a Madisonian
principle designed to sustain a government capable of checks and balances
and resistant to despotic rule. The Constitution vests certain exclusive and,
at times, unparalleled powers in the President and the executive branch that
are often invoked during times of war or other crises.32 The prevailing
rationale for this has been a presumption that the President and those under
his or her authority are best suited to make certain decisions due to special
knowledge and expertise.
Due to this framework, America has been greatly shaped since the
beginning by the individuals that have served as President. George
Washington's presidency framed what the Office of the President and the
executive branch would become. He established precedents that remain to
this day: for example, that the President can select persons to negotiate
foreign policy on behalf of the nation without Senate consent." And
Washington's choices were naturally guided by his own values; a
commitment to the principle of rule of law, civic virtue, and the unitary
public interest; and the particularities of his personality.34 Other Presidents'
personal values have been less constructive. Andrew Johnson's presidency,
for example, was shaped by his known racism, which greatly influenced how
the nation approached Reconstruction after the Civil War." In either case,
32 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2 ("The President shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States. . . ."); Ex parteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 6, 8-9 (1942), modified sub nom. U.S. ex rel.
Quirin v. Cox, 63 S. Ct. 22 (1942) (holding that special military commissions created by the President to
try suspected Nazi saboteurs during World War I are not to be set aside by the courts without clear
conviction). But see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("[The Court has] made clear that a
state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens.").
" BRUFF, supra note 3, at 42.
4
Id at 25-27.
3 Id at 157-58, 160.
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the electorate understands that the person it elects on Election Day will
determine the course of our nation, and of history.
What is less understood and more recondite is the source and amount of
authority and power that the lesser officials working on behalf of the
President within the executive branch have to make decisions that affect the
nation. Questions about just how far the delegation of the presidential
decision-making authority should extend through the ranks of the executive
36
branch abound, as officials therein hold more power than ever before. As
threats to our nation's security have increased, particularly in the aftermath
of the attacks on September 11, 2001, so too have the government's legal
authority and institutional capacity for meeting such threats. 7 Within the
executive branch there are at least forty-six federal agencies and departments
that play a role in national security decision making.38 In recent years,
individuals other than the President made choices that have afforded the use
of torture techniques banned by the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,39 and permitted the
6 For two cases where the Supreme Court struck down the delegation of congressional powers to
the executive branch, see Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Panama was struck down because it gave the President
unlimited authority to create policy and unlimited authority to determine the consequences of violating
such policy. Panama, 293 U.S. at 415. In Schechter, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]his is delegation
running riot." Schechter, 295 U.S. at 553. The Court has also struck down cases of delegation to private
parties. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) ("The power conferred upon the
majority is, in effect, the power to regulate the affairs of an unwilling minority.").
3
See Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyondcontrol/ [https://perma.cc/YQ65-5L4D] (last visited Nov. 26, 2016) ("Some 1,271 government
organizations and 1,931 private companies work on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland
security and intelligence in about 10,000 locations across the United States.")

3

See COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV'T REFORM, 112TH CONG., POLICY AND SUPPORTING

on over 8,000
POSITIONS iii (Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter Plum Book] ("[C]ontain[ing] data ...
Federal civil service leadership and support positions in the legislative and executive branches of the
Federal Government that may be subject to noncompetitive appointment."); Lyndsey Layton & Lois
Romano, "Plum Book" is Obama's Big Help-Wanted Ad, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/12/AR2008111203303.html
[https://perma.cc/A75L-47T5] (estimating that one third of the 8,000 jobs are presidential appointments);
Priest & Arkin, supra note 37 ("An estimated 854,000 people . .. hold top-secret security clearances.");
Camille Tuutti, How to Become a Presidential Appointee, FCW (Nov. 9, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/D2WZ-T7W9]
https://fcw.com/articles/2012/11/09/hire-presidential-appointees.aspx
(estimating that approximately 4,200 jobs are at the discretion of the administration and 500-600 jobs
have statutory exceptions or other limitations); see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND DOUBLE GOVERNMENT 16-18 (2015) (describing the institutions and actors engaged in classified
national security work as the "Trumanite Network").
3 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., on Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 1, 46
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020801 -1.pdf
1,
2002),
(Aug.
[https://perma.cdBS4S-FPFU]; Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., on
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, to William J. Haynes 11, Gen.
Counsel of the Dep't of Def 6 (Jan. 9, 2002), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/
documents/20020109.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ALR-UHWL]. For the treaty language, see Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1. 1., openedfor
signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, https://treaties.un.org/doc/
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targeted killing by drone of a U.S. citizen in a foreign country suspected of
terrorism and his son, who was not a suspect.40 Scores of other individuals
have made consequential national-security decisions that remain secret. 4 1
Some 854,000 government employees are believed to hold top-secret
clearance for classified government work. 42 The network of decision makers
now defies description, leading to increased concerns about the expansion
of executive-branch decision making and the reality of a "double
government." 4 3 But how far does the President's constitutionally derived
authority reach? What does the law require of other executive-branch
decision makers? Beyond norms built upon previous practice, what guidance
clarifies the level and scope of decision-making authority within the
executive branch? This Section explores the law pertaining to executivebranch decision making at two levels: those appointed to serve and those
selected by the President to serve without Senate consent. It then examines
actual individuals who have served and some of the choices they have made.
A.

The Law of Who Decides
1.

The Appointments Clause

The Constitution provides that the President and the Senate shall share
the power to appoint principal officers within the executive branch. The
particulars of such authority derive from the Appointments Clause, which
provides the U.S. Senate with oversight in the form of consent over who the
President may nominate as principal officers.44 First, the President selects
Publication/UNTS/Volume%201465/volume-1465-1-24841 -English.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9P32PGEX].
40 See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., on Applicability
of
Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar
al-Aulagi, to the Attorney Gen. 22-23 (July 16, 2010), http://wwwjustice.gov/sites/default/files/
olc/pages/attachments/2015/04/02/2010-07-16_-_olcaaga barron_-_al-aulaqi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
6LA9-SJ3F] (considering whether U.S. citizenship precludes the AUMF from providing legal authority
to engage in targeted killing through the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and finding it is not unlawful).
Ryan Browne, Daughter of Anwar Al-Awlaki Reported Killed in Yemen Raid, CNN (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/31/politics/yemen-raid-daughter-al-qaeda-leader/ [https://perma.cc/XT5JC8GJ] (reporting the death of 8-year old Nawar Anwar al-Awlaki as a result of the U.S. and UAE raid
against a suspected Al-Qaeda base).
" See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REv. 257, 257, 260-61, 315-17 (2010)
(describing the structural aspects of government secrets).
42 Priest & Arkin, supra note 37.
4 See GLENNON, supra note 38, at 16-18 (arguing that U.S. national security policy is controlled
more by a concealed "Trumanite network" and less by the president, and describing the threats this form
of double government poses for American democracy and legitimacy); GOLDSMITH, supra note 12, at
69-72 (describing the extent of "secret" war activities taken by the executive); and Priest & Arkin, supra

note 37 (describing that the top-secret government has been expanding since 9/11 terrorist attacks).
4 U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment
of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
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and nominates an officer. Next, the Senate considers and confirms that
nomination. Finally, the President officially appoints the confirmed nominee
who is then sworn into office.45 Additional procedures for making an
appointment to an advice-and-consent position are laid out in Senate Rule
XXV.4 6 If the position is considered an "inferior" officer, the President may
make such an appointment without the involvement of Congress under the
so-called Excepting Clause.4 7 Over the years, the exact scope of authority
between the Senate and the President has been tested, but the authority and
legitimacy of those individuals serving in the executive branch under the
Appointments Clause is clearly derived from the Constitution.48 Thus, their
capacity to be entrusted with high-level decisions enjoys a legitimacy that
extends from our Constitution.
The list of advice-and-consent positions in our modern executive branch
is vast.49 These include well-known Cabinet-level posts at the rank of
Secretary, Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary, Assistant Security, and often
the general counsels and inspectors general of agencies.o There are less
well-known positions requiring Senate consent such as the Librarian at the
Library of Congress or the Architect of the Capitol."' Under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Congress puts forth qualifications for holding certain
appointments, further limiting whom the President can nominate, although
the qualification power is itself constrained.52 Other general restrictions
apply. For example, an executive-branch officer may not serve in the
Congress at the same time." The basis for involving the Senate in high-level
executive-branch appointments is both to restrict presidential authority and
to grant additional legitimacy to whomever is ultimately chosen to serve.
Heads of Departments.").
45 CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & MICHAEL GREENE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30959,
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES
HANDLING NOMINATIONS 1 (2016).
4 Id
4 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
4

See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Edmond v. United States,
520 U.S. 651, 666 (1997) (validating judicial appointments in conformity with the Appointments Clause);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670 (1988) (categorizing Constitutional appointments into two classes:
principal and inferior officers); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 176 (1994) (holding that
appointment of military judges satisfies the Appointments Clause); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113
(1976) (deciding the process for appointing members to the Federal Election Committee); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926) (holding that the President has the exclusive power to remove
executive-branch officials and does not need the approval of the Senate or any other legislative body).
49 See CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 30959, supranote 45, at 5-47 (listing all the positions requiring
Senate consent).
'o Plum Book, supra note 38.
5' CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 30959, supra note 45, at 45.
52 See David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation

Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1519 (1992) (describing the Senate's power to reject nominees if they lack
requisite qualities); John 0. McGinnis, Essay, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the
Confirmation Process: A Reply to ProfessorsStrauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 644 (1993)
(noting the limitations of the Senate's ability to reject nominees based on requisite qualities).
53 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2.

726

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:713

Such legitimacy is thought necessary given the power of the appointment.
But the law stops there. It does not delve into the particulars of what
qualifications a nominee ought to have. In addition, external factors, such as
timing, often influence the Senate's determinations on nominees.
Consider the appointment of the first Director of Homeland Security
(DHS), Tom Ridge. Eleven days following September 11, 2001, President
George W. Bush nominated Ridge, then Governor of Pennsylvania, to serve
as DHS director.54 Although Ridge began work immediately, his
confirmation by the Senate did not take place until 2003.Y" During
deliberations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Chairman
Susan M. Collins expressed that Ridge was "exactly the right person for the
job. His background, temperament, and experience make him ideally
qualified. . . . These impressive credentials speak to the character of a
remarkable man."" Ridge served in the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War
and graduated from Harvard University before earning his J.D. from
Dickinson School of Law.57
This background, along with his service as governor, became the
qualities that Senators highlighted to make the case that Ridge was more
than competent for his new post. In doing so, they assumed a connection
between these criteria and the capacity to serve well. But were a legal
education and military experience the right markers of excellence to
consider? The Senators did not know and the legal process does not inform
them of the ideal qualities a candidate should possess.
Perhaps it should. As the first person to serve in this newly created role,
Ridge exerted a tremendous amount of influence over what DHS would
become and the power it would exert in the post-9/11 world. However, some
were critical of his inability to wrangle control away from the CIA and the
FBI in order to prepare DHS to take the lead it was meant to exercise." The
concern is that individuals can be formally appointed into very powerful
positions with no inquiry into what competencies are needed for the job.
" The Department was formally created under the Homeland Security Act on Nov. 25, 2002, which
consolidated twenty-two agencies under its purview. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107296 §§ 1-1717, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002); Creation ofthe Dep't ofHomeland Security, DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., http://dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security
[https://perma.cctY599XWGS] (last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
" Ridge was confirmed by the Senate on Jan. 22, 2003. Nomination of Hon. Thomas "Tom" J.
Ridge to be Secretary ofHomelandSecurity, Hearing before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th
Cong. 108-45 (2003).
6 Id at 2.
" Thomas J. Ridge, Homeland Security Secretary 2003-2005, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,

http://www.dhs.gov/thomas-j-ridge [https://perma.cc/3ZWB-YEH5] (last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
" Daniel B. Prieto, Ridge's Mixed Legacy on Homeland Security, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2004),
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2004-12-05/news/0412040365_1-tom-ridge-terrorist-threatintegration-center-homeland-security-act [https://perma.cc/5DZR-2VMK] (discussing Ridge's failures,
e.g., to place the Terrorist Threat Integration Center and the Terrorist Screening Center under DHS
command. They went to CIA and FBI, respectively, allegedly after CIA Director George Tenet and FBI
Director Robert Mueller lobbied President Bush).
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Moreover, once confirmed by the Senate, a person enjoys the color of
legality afforded them by the appointment process, which grants them
exceptional authority and legitimacy to make decisions as they see fit.
2.

Selected by the President

Beyond formal appointed positions, there are a number of people
serving in the executive branch who have been selected by the President
without Senate approval or other forms of oversight. Certain presidential
appointments no longer require Senate confirmation due to the Presidential
Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011.59 Among these
appointments are the Treasurer of the United States, the Director of the
Office of Counternarcotics within the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration. 60 n
addition, the President has the authority to make some appointments within
the White House without Senate confirmation.6 1
Presidential selection of an individual decision maker to serve as a top
policy official is well illustrated by the practice of creating "decision czars"
in American governance today. 62 There have been czars for long-term issues
such as climate change, urban affairs, and energy policy, and for immediate
crises like Hurricane Katrina or Y2K." Some czars are appointed formally
through Senate confirmation. Others are not.
The origin of decision czars can be traced to the Jones-Miller Act of
1922, which established the Federal Narcotics Control Board, the first
federal bureau tasked with drug control.' Harry Anslinger served as the first
Commissioner of its successor, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, for three
decades. 65 Anslinger's role mirrors the description of a decision czar because
he was personally able to establish the parameters of the war on drugs-at
the center of which was adopting a punitive criminal justice approach instead
of a preventative public health one. Anslinger worked to moralize narcotics
5 Presidential Appointment Efficiency and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-166, 126 Stat.
1283; see CONG. RESEARCH SERV. RL 30959, supra note 45, at 48-49.
6 Id.
61 Id. at 1 (describing positions that do not require Senate confirmation as the exceptions); Plum
Book, supra note 38, at 10 (listing Presidential Appointment positions without Senate confirmation); see,
e.g., id at 2, 5 (listing Brian McKeon, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs,
Executive Secretary, and NSC Chief of Staff; John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism; Denis R. McDonough, Assistant to the President and Deputy National
Security Advisor; Steven Lee VanRoekel, Administrator, Office of E-Government and Information
Technology).

62 JUSTIN S. VAUGHN & JOSE D. VILLALOBOS, CZARS IN THE WHITE HOUSE: THE RISE OF POLICY
CZARS AS PRESIDENTIAL MANAGEMENT TOOLS 9-14 (2015) (noting the lack of an agreed-upon

definition and identifying key dimensions that define what a policy czar does).
Id. at 9-19.
' Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, ch. 202, 42 Stat. 596 (1922) (codified as 21 U.S.C.

63

§ 172
(1925)); see 5 U.S.C. § 282b (1930) (transferring the powers of the Federal Narcotics Control Board to
the Commissioner of Narcotics).
65 VAUGHN & VILLALOBOS, supra note 62, at 62. Anslinger served from 1930-1962.
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and marijuana, in part by promoting the production of Hollywood films
depicting drug use as immoral. His ability to heavily shape American drug
policy is notable. It was driven by the fact that as first Commissioner he
created the office and its agendas, but also by the fact that he had the latitude

to do

so. 66

Other czars have enjoyed less success. John A. Love, former Governor
of Colorado, was the first energy czar.67 In 1973, President Nixon created
the Energy Policy Office by executive order and tapped Love to head the
office. Love's performance was criticized within and outside of the
administration. 6 ' He was ultimately usurped by William E. Simon (chair of
Oil Policy Committee at the U.S. Department of the Treasury), who Nixon
appointed as the first chair of the Federal Energy Office within the Executive
Office of the President.69
In recent decades, presidential appointment of czars during the aftermath
of a crisis has become increasingly commonplace. After Hurricane Katrina,
for example, Donald Powell, the chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, was tapped by the Bush Administration to be its recovery
czar.7 0 Powell's power in this role consisted of his ability to guide federal
funds in certain directions. In reality, he became the target of public and
government complaints. Ron Klain received praise for his role as the Ebola
czar.7 ' Richard Holbrooke served as President Obama's Afghanistan czar
and Ed Montgomery was named auto communities' recovery czar.72
Decision czars challenge the Appointments Clause paradigm. They may
be appointed without Senate confirmation, but commonly exercise power
and authority thought to fall outside of the "inferior" category under the
Appointments Clause. Those critical of such use of power argue that czars
operate outside constitutional authority. Others believe that presidential
selection of advisers is within a President's constitutional powers. The
central matter for legal interpretation is whether a person is a principal
officer or an inferior officer. The test articulated in Buckley v. Valeo" turns

'Id at 62, 64-65; see H.J. ANSLINGER& WILLIAM F. TOMPKINS, THE TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS Vii,
168, 213, 215, 293, 295-97 (1953) (explaining the need to change public perception about drugs and
praising the Motion Picture Producers Association of America prohibition on showing drugs in films and
reinforcing the need for harsh penalties for violators).
67 VAUGHN & VILLALOBOS, supra note 62, at 44-45.
68

Id. at 45-46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 16-17.
" See Press Release, White House, Statement by the President on the Departure of Ron Klain (Feb.
12, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/12/statement-president-departure-ronklain [https://permacc/49QF-3ZNE] (praising Ron Klain for taking on an insurmountable challenge).
72 For an unofficial list of czar positions under President Obama,
see President Obama's 'Czars',
POLITICO (Sept. 4, 2009, 6:19 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2009/09/president-obamas-czars026779 [https://perma-cc/4P3N-74K8].
7 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
69
0
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on whether an officer exercises "significant authority." 74 In Morrison v.
Olson,75 the Court demarcated the parameters of an inferior officer.76 Factors
include removability by a higher official in the executive branch who is not
the President and limitations on duties, jurisdiction, and tenure. 77 In Edmond
v. United States,78 inferior officers were further defined to be persons who
were supervised by a principal officer. 79 The Court's opinion, citing previous
cases, identified a district court clerk, an election supervisor, a vice consul
serving temporarily as consul, a U.S. commissioner and an independent
counsel under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 as "inferior officers."so
The proliferation of executive-branch decision czars illustrates a central
concern this Article exposes. It is not simply the expansion of executivebranch power that troubles people. It is also the reality that one individual
can hold such power and can make decisions, rightly or wrongly, without
much accountability or oversight. Representative Steve Scalise (La.)
expressed this concern well when he called czars "unappointed,
unaccountable people who are literally running a shadow government,
heading up these little fiefdoms that nobody can really seem to identify
where they are or what they're doing. . . . But we do know that they're
wielding vast amounts of power."' The lack of clear guidance about what a
czar is and what a czar may or may not do raises important concerns about
the expansion of executive-branch power. Concerns about legality are
intertwined with questions about decision-making competence. When
decision czars make choices that achieve administration objectives,
questions about their constitutional authority are not often raised. But when
decision czars wield too much power or make moves deemed dangerous or
illegal, questions about constitutionality and their competence as decision
makers come to the fore. In either case, "decision" czars have the power to
make choices that greatly impact the public. Accordingly, the cognitive
competence of those individuals should be carefully considered.

74
See id. at 125-26 (finding that the Appointments Clause is a matter of "etiquette or protocol" that
provides a structural safeguard of separation of powers by preventing congressional encroachment on the
Executive or Judicial Branches).
s Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
7
6 Id. at 671-72.
77id.
7 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
7 See id. at 658, 662 (finding that only the President, department heads, and courts of law have the
power to appoint and that "[g]enerally speaking, the term 'inferior officer' connotes a relationship with
some higher ranking officer or officers below the President: whether one is an 'inferior' officer depends
on whether he has a superior.").
0
Id. at 661.
"' Robin Bravender, House Votes to Overthrow 'Czars', POLITICO (Feb. 17, 2011, 9:13 AM),
[https://perma.cc/
http://www.politico.com/story/2011/02/house-votes-to-overthrow-czars-049781
P9KM-AKVB].
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B. Real DecisionMoments
Once appointed or otherwise selected, the law does not govern the
particular choices an executive-branch decision maker makes or how she or
he makes them. Yet, as the following Section illustrates, an individual's
beliefs and biases can impel and even determine decision outcomes that
affect the nation and the world. This Section examines three well-known
executive-branch decision moments regarding torture, targeted killing, and
use of atomic weapons. These examples were chosen because they represent
difficult decision moments and the choices taken are widely viewed as
controversial. People disagree with them on legal, political, and moral
grounds. The purpose of this retelling is not to refute or to advance those
views but to illustrate how influential the choices of one person can be in the
executive branch. Accordingly, if one person can prompt grave government
action, we need to examine how individuals decide in order to better govern.
The aim is to highlight what much of the scholarship misses: that the
particular individuals authorized under the law to make decisions have
shaped the course of American governance in unprecedented ways. Put
simply, individual choice in executive-branch decision making matters.
1.

The "Torture Memos"

Within the executive branch, the Office of the Legal Counsel (OLC) in
the Department of Justice has traditionally played an essential decisionmaking role. The OLC is tasked with reviewing the President's executive
orders, providing legal advice on constitutional questions to the executive
branch, and serving as counsel to the Attorney General.82 In recognition of
its principal role, the office is traditionally led by an Assistant Attorney
General who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. By
the end of 2001, Jay Bybee was the man serving in this post. His Deputy
Assistant Attorney General was John Yoo. They are now infamous for their
role and joint responsibility in writing and sending to the White House a
series of legal memoranda referred to as the "Torture Memos" that sought
to create unprecedented expansion of executive-branch authority under
Article II of the Constitution to "conduct" war inside and outside of the
United States in the aftermath of 9/11 and in response to the so-called War
on Terror.

82
Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/olc
[https://perma-cc/ZB4L-W2W7] (last visited Nov. 28, 2016).
13 Bybee, supra note 39, at 33-39; Yoo, supra note 39, at 14-16, 38-41. For an overview of the

thirty-four key documents in the "War on Terror" listed in chronological order from September 11, 2001
through January
15, 2009, see Read the Key Documents, NAT'L SEC.
ARCHIVE,

http://nsarchive.gwu.edultorturingdemocracy/documents/ [https://perma.cc/4XN5-JCRK] (last visited
Nov. 28, 2016).
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John Yoo's choices, notwithstanding other individuals who also were
involved, have cost the nation in innumerable ways. Senator John McCain,
for example, argued that the United States' use of harsh interrogation
techniques was "inexcusabl[y] linked" to the use of such methods by the
country's enemies.84 Certain decisions made in those memos were later
repealed by the White House in recognition that the authorization of harsh
interrogation practices and redefining torture were inconsistent with existing
law and were ineffective in achieving intelligence-gathering objectives."
Why focus on John Yoo? He is but one of many executive-branch
decision makers, true. But his story illustrates a central point this Article is
exploring-that individual choice, which is impacted by a complex set of
cognitive factors, plays a far greater role in shaping executive-branch
decisions than many have acknowledged. Much of the subsequent analysis
of John Yoo's decisions in the "Torture Memos" looks at how he could have
reached the outcomes he did in applying the applicable law to the facts. In
his January 9, 2002 memo, Yoo found that protections provided by the
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment did not apply to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban." Several
months later, Yoo's boss, John Bybee, authored a memo justifying the use
of certain interrogation methods on the grounds that they were not torture,
as they fell short of causing serious physical injury, organ failure, or death."
Article I of the Convention defines the term "torture"" but does not define
" Press Release, Office of John McCain, Levin, McCain Release Executive Summary and
Conclusions of Report on Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody (Dec. 15, 2008),
http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2008/12/post-3b82ef53-0109-44cl-82aa5b0ca0323d59 [https://permacc/P5R2-V8XE].
8s See Jack L. Goldsmith Ill, Assistant U.S. Att'y Gen., "Protected Persons" Status in Occupied
Iraq
under
the
Fourth
Geneva
Convention
3,
5
(Mar.
18,
2004),
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20040318.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 8YTB-K464]
(declaring that the Geneva Convention protections apply to citizens and permanent residents of Iraq and
thus reinstituting the Geneva ban on the use of torture); Memorandum for the Files, Steven G. Bradbury,
Principal Deputy Assistant U.S. Att'y Gen, October 23, 2001 OLC Opinion Addressing the Domestic
Use
of
Military
Force
to
Combat
Terrorist
Activities
(Oct.
6,
2008),
27GP[https://perma.cc/
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/torturingdemocracy/documents/20081006.pdf
AXEX] (repudiating John Yoo's classified memo finding that the First and Fourth Amendments must
give way if the President finds it necessary for defense of the nation); Findings and Conclusions, Senate
Committee on Intelligence Report on CIA Detention and Interrogation Practice 2-3 (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2014_rpt/ssci-rdi.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5B7-FETV] (finding that the CIA's
interrogation techniques were ineffective and inaccurate claims about their effectiveness were used to
justify the techniques).
' Yoo, supra note 39, at I ("We conclude that these treaties do not protect members of the AlQaeda organization .... [or] the Taliban organization.").
8 Bybee, supra note 39, at 1.
* United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 1, Apr. 18, 1988, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/CAT.aspx [https://perma.cc/LN2Z-WYFS] ("I.
For the purposes of this Convention, the term 'torture' means any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason
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the term "severe pain." Yoo and Bybee's legal analysis and advice was based
on their conclusion that severe pain amounting to torture "must be equivalent
in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.""
But scrutinizing Yoo's legal analysis is only part of the story.
Interviewed ten years later, Yoo offers telling reflections on his role as an
executive branch decision maker with extreme authority. When asked in
2011 if he believes that waterboarding constitutes torture, Yoo responded "I
thought that was the hardest question that we had to face in the government.
Personally, I don't think so." 90 These remarks illustrate at least two concerns
this Article expresses. First, that monumental government choices can be
determined by a few individuals (and sometimes only one). Second, that
such individuals make choices, in part, based on their own personal beliefs
and biases, even when they are not aware they are doing so. John Yoo admits
to both. How did Yoo account for his personal views on torture? We do not
know. But we do know that the decision process invoked his personal views
in addition to legal reasoning. This is a conspicuous example of how the
decisions of one individual can have dramatic effect on the nation and the
world. It serves to illustrate this Article's concern with the lack of legal
attention to what constitutes decision-making competence in executivebranch governance. 91 To presume competence based on a person's legal
authority to decide is not good enough.
2. Drone Strikes on US. CitizensAbroad
The lessons from the John Yoo era led to some structural and procedural
reforms within the OLC. Today, its role in national security decision making
has been diminished. The Senate has been reluctant to confirm new
appointees. 92 There has also been a resurgence of interagency consultation
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence ofa public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. 2. This article
is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation which does or may contain
provisions of wider application.").
89 Bybee, supra note 39, at 1.
* Rob Mank, Ten Years After 9/11, John Yoo Defends His Legacy, Legality of Waterboarding,CBS

NEWS (Sept. 9,2011 11:26 PM), http://www.cbsnews.connews/ten-years-after-9-1 1-john-yoo-defendshis-legacy-legality-of-waterboarding/ [https://perma.cc/C2XU-UTA2].
" For an interesting account of the "institutional conditions that made these memos possible," see
ACKERMAN, supranote 12, at 6.
9 Charlie Savage, White House Fills Top Post atJustice Department, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/us/politics/white-house-fills-office-of-legal-counselpost.html? r=0 [https://perma.cc/M2C4-STLS). After John Yoo, Jack Goldsmith was confirmed by the
Senate and appointed. Mank, supranote 90 (discussing John Yoo's position as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General at the Justice Department between 2001 and 2003); Savage, supra. After he left in June 2004,
OLC was led by a series of acting assistant attomeys general until the Senate confirmed the appointment
of Virginia Seitz on June 28, 2011. Savage, supra. She served until December 2013. Id The OLC is
currently led by Acting Assistant Attorney General, Curtis E. Gannon. Meet the Leadership, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE
(last updated Jan.
20, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/olc/meet-leadership
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via the so-called "Lawyers Group" comprised of the legal teams that advise
the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
National Intelligence, the State Department, and several other agencies. 93
The general response to the mistake of the Torture Memos has been to
decrease decision-making power within the OLC and to increase decisionmaking oversight across the executive branch.
But to some, these reforms did not do enough to curb executive
dominance. The decisions taken by the Department of Justice under the
leadership of then-Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. that allowed for the
operation to target and kill Anwar al-Awlaki in Yemen in September of 2011
have renewed concerns about who can and who should decide such matters.
Mr. al-Awlaki was a U.S. citizen killed by a drone attack operated by the
CIA on the grounds that he was a suspected terrorist who posed a
continuous, imminent threat to the U.S. 94 A month later, his teenage son and
two other U.S. citizens were also killed in a drone strike in Yemen, although
the son was not "specifically targeted." Because Mr. al-Awlaki was a U.S.
citizen, he was entitled to receive due process. In traditional domestic
settings, due-process protections include being formally charged with a
crime and having a trial by jury.96
In this case of first instance, the Justice Department decided that this
constitutional protection could be met by having executive-branch officials
review the available information and make a determination instead of a trial.
In a May 2013 letter to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney
General Holder revealed previously classified information about the matter.
His letter stated that targeting a U.S. citizen was permissible if the person
posed "an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States" as
long as capturing said person was "not feasible." 97 The public became aware
in 2014 of this secret decision, after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
[https://perma-cc/3WKL-T5VL].
" John Bellinger, Charlie Savage and the NSC Lawyers Group, LAWFARE (Nov. 8, 2015, 11:25
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/charlie-savage-and-nsc-lawyers-group [https://perma.cc/HXN2KMVT] (describing the existence and practices of the Lawyers Group in 2014-2015).
94 Greg Miller, Legal Memo Backing Drone Strike that Killed American Anwar al-Awlaki is

Released, WASH. POST (June 23,2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legalmemo-backing-drone-strike-is-released/2014/06/23/1 f48ddl6-faec- lle3-8176f2c941cf35fl story.html [https://perma.cc/9K8V-8NQC].
9 Letter from Eric H. Holder, U.S. Att'y Gen., to the Hon. Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (May 22, 2013) [hereinafter Holder Letter]
https://wwwjustice.gov/slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2ST-79JX].
96 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that trial by jury is an essential
component ofjustice and a guaranteed right in criminal cases).
" Holder Letter, supra note 95 ("Such considerations allow for the use of lethal force in a foreign

country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa'ida or its associated forces, and
who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, in the following circumstances: (1) the U.S.
government has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent
threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is not feasible; and (3) the operation would
be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles.").
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Circuit ordered the Justice Department to release parts of the memo. The
revelation renewed concerns about what our government can do to citizens
in the name of national security and who gets to make those choices."
With this decision, in contrast to the John Yoo example, the ultimate
choice was signed off by a Cabinet-level official selected by the President
and appointed by the Senate-Attorney General Holder. Holder commented
that the decision was lawful, carefully considered, and "just."99 He argued
that "high-level government officials appropriately concluded" that Mr. alAwlaki posed a continuing and imminent threat and that "senior officials"
determined that capture was not feasible.'o These same "senior officials"
also concluded that the operation was consistent with law of war principles
and that the "operation was also undertaken consistent with Yemeni
sovereignty."' 0 ' But are these the proper criteria for making a decision to
take a person's life based on unproved suspicion? Should this increased
authority and purported legitimacy eliminate fears about executive-branch
dominance? Is the legal authority to decide a reasonable substitute for
competent decision making?
Questioning the cognitive competence of decision makers would require
considering additional factors beyond legal authority. These might include
whether the deciders slept well the night before or went for a run that
morning. Had any of them been to Yemen? What emotional associations
were invoked in thinking about a "suspected terrorist"? Did the facts
surrounding Mr. al-Awlaki-that he was Muslim, a man, brown-skinned, a
cleric-invoke bias in the decision makers' minds? Considering how
decisions are made at the cognitive level would also give rise to thinking
critically about how to present information to decision makers. Showing
them a chart of information versus photographic evidence would implicate
how their brains began to process the decision.10 2
3.

The Target Committee and Hiroshima

On August 6, 1945, the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb Little Boy on
Hiroshima and three days later dropped FatMan on the city of Nagasaki.103
The decision to do so changed the world forever. Within minutes, thousands
were dead and many more would later experience the sickening effects of
radiation.' 04 Japan surrendered within weeks, bringing an end to the Second
9 See N.Y. Times v. United States, 756 F.3d 93, 95-96 (2d Cir. 2014) (requiring the Government
to publicly file the memos).
9 Holder Letter, supra note 95.

100 Id
l2
103

See infra Section II for specifics.
Hiroshima

and

Nagasaki,

http://www.aasc.ucla.edu/cab/200708150001.htmi
2016).

CHILDREN

OF

THE

ATOMIC

BOMB,

[https://perma-cc/4442-9SN8] (last visited Nov. 28,

" Hiroshima and Nagasaki Death Toll, CHILDREN OF THE ATOMIC BOMB (Oct. 10, 2007, 7:55
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World War.o"
At the time, the public was largely unaware of the existence of the
atomic bomb. However, most would assume that deciding to use a weapon
of such catastrophic power would be made by the U.S. President, operating
as Commander-in-Chief. But, the story of this decision moment is much
more complex. The series of choices that led to the bombings were made by
a group of scientists and military officials known as the Target Committee,
under the President's delegated authority.' 06 Of note here is that the criteria
for where the U.S. would bomb Japan were set forth by General Leslie
10 7
Groves-a seemingly appropriate task for a general during wartime.
These criteria were then given to the decision-making group, the Target
Committee, comprised of top scientists and military personnel.' Four cities
were shortlisted as targets initially: Kyoto, Hiroshima, Yokohama, and
Kokura.' 09 Although it technically met the criteria and was an acceptable
target, Kyoto was later taken off of the list by Secretary of State Henry
Stimson, who had fond memories of his past visit there prompting his desire
to save it from atomic devastation. 1 o Ultimately, it was the Target
Committee's choices, deliberations, and silences-not those of President
Harry Truman-that resulted in the use of two atomic bombs on two
particular Japanese cities on two particular days in 1945.
PM), http://www.aasc.ucla-edu/cab/200708230009.html [https://perma.cc/9PVY-5QLB] (describing
death estimates based on eyewitness reports for Hiroshima to be between 90,000 to 120,000 and between
60,000 to 80,000 for Nagasaki).
1945 (available at
Japan-U.S., Sept. 2,
1os See Instrument of Surrender,
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/1752336) (expressing Japan's formal surrender to the Allied Powers).
'" See Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Target Committee Los Alamos, May 10-l1, 1945
[https://perma.cc/NT6U-XSRH]
(July 19, 2015), http://www.dannen.com/decision/targets.html
(detailing the meeting of the Target Committee to discuss bombing strategies); see also PAUL HAM,
HIROSHIMA NAGASAKI: THE REAL STORY OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS AND THEIR AFTERMATH 147-53

(2014) (detailing how the Target Committee was responsible for determining which locations in Japan
the U.S. should use its new atomic weapons on). The Committee consisted of thirteen people, largely
scientists and military officials, who met several times during the summer of 1945 to decide the
particulars of where to drop the atomic bomb and why. HAM, supraat 147-62. Influenced by Committee
members Oppenheimer, Compton, Lawrence and Fermi, President Truman adopted the unanimous
advice of the Committee to use the bomb on the two cities the Committee had identified. Id. at 162. On
July 25, 1945, General Leslie Groves of the Committee delivered a finalized list of targets in a directive
to General Carl Spaatz in charge of the U.S. Strategic Air Force in the Pacific. Id at 281. On August 6,
the directive was carried out. Id. at 294-300.
"o7See Paul Ham, The BureaucratsWho Singled Out Hiroshimafor Destruction,ATLANTIC (Aug.
6, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2015/08/hiroshima-nagasaki-atomic-bombanniversary/400448/ ("The target should: possess sentimental value to the Japanese so its destruction
would 'adversely affect' the will of the people to continue the war; have some military significancemunitions factories, troop concentrations, and so on; be mostly intact, to demonstrate the awesome
destructive power of an atomic bomb; and be big enough for a weapon of the atomic bomb's
magnitude.").
108 Id.

' HAM, supra note 106, at 148.
Id .at 162 ("At this point, Stimson revived his personal mission to save Kyoto.") Ham, supra
note 107 (Stimson argued that Kyoto 'must not be bombed. It lies in the form of a cup and thus would
be exceptionally vulnerable. . .. It is exclusively a place of homes and art and shrines."').
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The first two examples of decision moments illustrate how individual
choice greatly influenced government decision moments taken in the pursuit
of national security that expanded the legality of executive-branch authority.
This third example calls into question the wisdom of the President to
delegate certain choices to those under his command even when he has the
purported authority to do so. When the choice was made to use atomic
weapons during World War II, the decision-making process reveals that
people other than the President made judgments that determined the ultimate
outcome."'
C. Determining Who Should Decide
The purpose of the examples, history, and legal analysis presented here
is to raise the following questions: What should qualify an individual for a
top decision-making role in the executive branch? Are there metrics for
measuring who will be a good decision-maker? At present, law does not
have the answers. This Article has described the constitutionally derived
legal guidance for creating executive-branch officials and granting them
with the power and legitimacy to make critical decisions on behalf of our
nation. Once appointed, selected, or otherwise chosen, those that serve are
presumed competent to do so. But there is very little inquiry into what
qualifications make someone ideal or even eligible for the role.
Consider the prominent post of the National Security Advisor (NSA).
This person is appointed by the President but is not subject to Senate
confirmation despite the fact that, in practice, the position involves making
significant decisions often attributed to a principal-officer role. The National
Security Council was created under the National Security Act of 1947,
which stipulated the creation of an executive secretary in charge of the staff
to advise the President on domestic, foreign, and military policy concerning
matters of national security." 2 Below is a list of the twenty-three NSAs since
1947 (noting military service and Ivy League education)."'

"' See Petition from Leo Szilard and Other Scientists to President Harry S. Truman, (July 17, 1945),
https://research.archives.gov/id/6250638 [https://perma.cc/W8AJ-CR8B] (requesting that the decision
on whether to use the atomic bombs be decided in light of input from scientists working in the field of
atomic power).
112 National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 402(a),
(c) (2012).
113 Names and dates of service in office are sourced from List of National
Security Advisors of the
United States, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/list-of-national-securityadvisers-of-the-United-States-1788874 [https://perma-cc/B3KN-E2RE] (last updated Oct. 7, 2014),
along with the biographical data for NSA's Bundy, Rostow, Kissinger, Powell, Rice, Jones, and Rice.
The remaining biographical data is sourced from the Historyofthe NationalSecurity Council 1947-1997,
THE
WHITE
HOUSE:
PRESIDENT
GEORGE
W.
BUSH,
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/history.htmi [https://perma.cc/PV2K-BTD2] (last visited Dec. 1, 2016);
John P. Burke, The NationalSecurity Advisor and Staff Transition Challenges, in THE WHITE HOUSE
TRANSmON PROJECT REPORTS 2009-02 (2008); and from biographies from various online sources, e.g.,
Appointment of John M Poindexter as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, REGAN
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NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS

1 Robert Cutler (March 23, 1953-April 2, 1955)*^
2 Dillon Anderson (April 2, 1955-September 1, 1956)*^
3 Robert Cutler (January 7, 1957-June 24, 1958)*^
4 Gordon Gray (June 24, 1958-January 13, 1961)*^
5 McGeorge Bundy (January 20, 1961-February 28, 1966)*A
6 Walt W. Rostow (April 1, 1966-January 20, 1969)*^
7 Henry A. Kissinger (January 20, 1969-November 3, 1975)*^
8 Brent Scowcroft (November 3, 1975-January 20, 1977)*^
9 Zbigniew Brzezinski (January 20, 1977-January 21, 1981)*
10 Richard V. Allen (January 21, 1981-January 4, 1982)
11 William P. Clark (January 4, 1982-October 17, 1983)*^
12 Robert C. McFarlane (October 17, 1983-December 4, 1985)^
13 John M. Poindexter (December 4, 1985-November 25, 1986)^
14 Frank C. Carlucci (December 2, 1986-November 23, 1987)*
15 Colin L. Powell (November 23, 1987-January 20, 1989)^
16 Brent Scowcroft (January 20, 1989-January 20, 1993)^
17 W. Anthony Lake (January 20, 1993-March 14, 1997)*
18 Samuel R. Berger (March 14, 1997-January 20, 2001)*
19 Condoleezza Rice (January 22, 2001-January 25, 2005)*
20 Stephen Hadley (January 26, 2005-January 20, 2009)*
21 James L. Jones (January 20, 2009-October 8, 2010)*^
22 Thomas E. Donilon (October 8, 2010-July 1, 2013)
23 Susan Rice (July 1, 2013-January 19, 2017)*
24 Michael T. Flynn (January 20, 2017-present)^
This data could suggest that people identified as competent to serve the
President in the role of NSA descriptively share certain educational and
experiential qualities that make them qualified for the role. All but seven
NSAs apparently attended an Ivy League school such as Harvard, Yale, or
Princeton.1 14 Most have military experience."' All but three NSAs have
been white men. Colin Powell, an African-American man, and Condoleezza
Rice and Susan Rice, both African-American women, are the sole
exceptions.
But a closer look at the data reveals another story. Many of the NSAs
enjoyed close professional and even personal relationships with the
https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1985/120485e.htm
ARCHIVES,
LIBRARY
[https://perma.cc/E58K-9PZU] (last visited Jan. 16, 2017) (biography of NSA President John M.
Poindexter). The symbol * indicates a bachelor's and/or graduate degree from an Ivy League school or

Oxford and Cambridge. The symbol A indicates some form of military service including enrollment at a
military college or university.
114 National Security Advisers table, infra.
115Id
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President they served prior to his election. In other instances, NSAs knew
key officials, such as the Secretary of Defense, who recommended them for
the post. Networks, such as the Bilderberg Group, play a significant role in
establishing such connections.117 This suggests that appointment to a senior
executive-branch post is often based on criteria beyond education and
experience.
Furthermore, there is no comprehensive data on what cognitive
competencies these individuals should have to excel in their jobs.
Knowledge about such is purely anecdotal. NSA Jones famously criticized
his successor saying that Donilon displayed "too little feel for the people
who work day and night. . . ."'" Are such criteria important for the job?
Although many who have worked in the White House would say yes,
comprehensive analysis of this question is lacking.119
Similar questions surround the presumption of competence afforded to
various czars. Why, for example, was Angslinger hired? What made him the
person selected for the job? Aptly put by Senator Joe Lieberman during a
congressional hearing on czardom, "[w]ho is deserving in this instance of
the title of 'czar?""'20 Perhaps, Ken Feinberg's unique expertise justified the
choice to appoint him as the "Pay Czar." Maybe Cass Sunstein's
demonstrated intellect as a Harvard Law professor and noted author
provided strong reason to make him the "Regulatory Czar." But the reality
is that we do not really know and the law does not ask. By studying what
decision-making competence looks like in our brains, we can better
determine who is best qualified to decide in our government.

116

NSA William Clark, for example, was a friend of Ronald Reagan's. See EDMUND MORRIS,

DUTCH: A MEMOIR OF RONALD REAGAN 455, 663 (1999).

"..NSA Thomas Donilon was a former Steering Committee Member of the Bilderberg Group. See
Former Steering Committee Members, BILDERBERG MEETINGS, http://bilderbergmeetings.org/former-

steering-committee-members.html [https://perma.cc/Y33A-GE6L] (last visited Nov. 22, 2016) (listing
Tom Donilon as member of Bilderberg Group); see also About Bilderberg Meetings, BILDERBERG
MEETINGS, http://bilderbergmeetings.org/index [https://perma.cc/8LPA-AZZH] (last visited Nov. 22,
2016) (stating that the Bilderberg Group aims to foster discussion among world and industry leaders in
a private setting).
118 BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA'S WARS 200 (2010); Marcus Baram, Tom Donilon Would Be a
'Disaster'asNationalSecurity Adviser, Robert Gates Reportedly Said, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8,2010,

11:22
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/08/tom-donilon-disaster-national-securityadvisor_n_755708.html [https://perma.cc/D3RV-RBG4].
"9 in the interest of full disclosure, this author has worked in the White House at the Office of the
United States Trade Representative, at the U.S. State Department, and at the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency in various civil service positions as one of those people who work day and night.
120 PresidentialAdvice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy Czars:

Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs, Illth Cong. 1 (2009) (opening
statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG11I shrg53850/html/CHRG-1 I 1shrg53850.htm [https://perma.cc/2W8N-JWUC]).
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H. How BRAINS DECIDE
Neuroscience is leading the way in evidence-based understandings
about our brains and decision making.' 2 ' The prevailing view is that a
person's mind and a person's brain are functionally the same.' 22 Thus,
decisions are made in our brain, not by a separate mind. 123 Neurolaw is the
title given to emerging legal scholarship that aims to apply neuroscientific
insights to questions of legal importance.1 24 Much of the work in this area
concerns criminal law.' 25 Neuroscience informs legal questions about
criminal culpability and intentionality, for example, by revealing the degree
of choice or free will a person executes over her or his intentional acts. Other
scholars have applied neuroscience to questions regarding tort, dispute
121 Public interest and professional engagement in neuroscience is growing. See EBEN ALEXANDER,
PROOF OF HEAVEN: A NEUROSURGEON'S JOURNEY INTO THE AFTERLIFE 8 (2012) (stating how
neuroscience helps to learn more about the modem brain as well as helping heal people); NORMAN
DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF vxi (2007) (discussing how the neuroplastic revolution has
implications on different aspects of human life); MICHIO KAKU, THE FUTURE OF THE MIND 4 (2014)
(noting the movement to understand how the human brain functions). For work at the intersection of
neuroscience and business, see generally SRINIVASAN PILLAY, YOUR BRAIN AND BUSINESS: THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF GREAT LEADERS 3 (2011) (stating that neuroscience is improving performance in the
business environment); TARA SWART ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE FOR LEADERSHIP: HARNESSING THE BRAIN
GAIN ADVANTAGE 2 (2015) (describing how the brain and decision-making processes work together);
MATTHEW WILCOX, THE BUSINESS OF CHOICE: MARKETING TO CONSUMERS' INSTINCTS 11-12 (2015)
(detailing the three trends of decision science which resulted in an "explosion of learning from behavioral
and social sciences"); Joseph Folkman, Are Different Skills Requiredfor Senior Executives?, FORBES
(Aug. 22, 2014, 8:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/joefolkman/2014/08/22/are-different-skillsrequired-for-senior-executives/# I 00ed4207690 (observing the difference in strategies and skills between
lower level managers and senior executives).
122 PARDO & PATTERSON, supranote 28, at 20 (arguing against this dominant view stating that such
thinking is prone to a "mereological fallacy" where one conflates empirical data with conceptual data).
The authors believe that scholars should question evidence that equates neural capacities within the brain
with human capacities and argue that the two are not the same. Id.

123 Patricia Smith Churchland, MoralDecision-Makingand the Brain, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING
THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 4-5 (Judy Illes ed., 2006).
124 See Oliver R. Goodenough, Mapping Cortical Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and
Moral Intuition, 41 JURIMETRICS 429, 431 (2001) (arguing for re-conceptualizing law in response to
neuroscience and was awarded the Jurimetrics Research Award).
"2 For legal scholarship discussing the intersection of criminal law and neuroscience see THE

MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, VANDERBILT UNIV.,

http://www.lawneuro.org [https://perma.cc/9R48-XC52] (providing a forum for scholarship
investigating the intersection of neuroscience and criminal law); Amanda C. Pustilnik, Pain as Factand
Heuristic: How Pain Neuroimaging Illuminates Moral Dimensions of Law, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 801,
804 (2012) (suggesting that neuroimaging will assist in achieving reliable quantification in cases); Terry
A. Maroney, Adolescence Brain Science After Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765, 766
(2011) (arguing the influence of neuroscience in a Supreme Court decision); Teneille Brown & Emily
Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimagingas Evidence of a CriminalDefendant's
PastMental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1129 (2010) (addressing the use of neuroimaging to support
mens rea claims); Steven K. Erickson, Blaming the Brain, 11 MINN. J. L. ScI. TECH. 27, 28-29 (2010)
(describing the shift towards biological sciences in issues of criminal responsibility); Owen D. Jones et
al., Brain Imagingfor Legal Thinkers: A Guidefor the Perplexed, 5 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 5-6 (2009)
(discussing the various uses of brain images in legal proceedings); and 0. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging
and the "Complexity" of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1269 (2007) (noting that
cognitive neuroscientists seek to invoke brain imaging research on the neurobiological roots of criminal
violence).
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resolution, and philosophy.' This Section provides a novel look at how
neuroscientific evidence on decision making might apply to individuals
making choices on our nation's behalf.
A. Preliminariesand Conditions
Neuroscience is the study of neurons, their functions and their
organization in the brain. 127 Neuroanatomy maps what regions of the brain
exist.1 28 We know, for example, that the frontal lobe is located behind our
foreheads, the occipital lobe is behind the nape of our necks, and that there
are regions of the brain that remain undiscovered.1 29 Advances in
neuroimaging allow us to observe anatomical connectivity (e.g., how
different regions of the brain connect) and functional connectivity (e.g., how
different cognitive processes interact), which permits the study of how
structure and function are connected.' Researchers use various tools to
study brain activity and function, from the older electroencephalography
(EEG), which measures electrical activity, to newer methods such as trans
cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) for testing changes in brain activity.

126 For legal scholarship discussing neuroscience in philosophy, dispute resolution, tort and other
areas, see Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, PhilosophicalFoundationsof Law and Neuroscience,
2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 1211, 1213 (2010) (noting the issues of neurosciences' implications for the law);

Elizabeth E. Bader, The Psychology and Neurobiology ofMediation, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.

363, 364 (2016) (exploring the connection "between psychological and neurobiological dimensions" in
mediation); Robert J. Condlin, The "Nature" ofLegal Dispute Bargaining, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT

RESOL. 393, 394-95 (2016) (noting the social phenomenon of legal dispute bargaining); Richard Birke,
Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination ofScientiftc Innovations and PracticalApplications, 25

OHIO ST. J. DISPUTE RES. 477, 478 (2011) (discussing the effect of neuroscience in negotiations and
mediations); Jay Sterling Silver, Intent Reconceived, 101 IOWA L. REV. 371, 379 (2015) (describing the
effect of intent in tort cases); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & Eric J. Laury, Towarda Neuroscience Model of
Tort Law: How Functional Neuroimaging Will Transform Tort Doctrine, 13 COLUM. SC. & TECH L.

REV. 235, 237 (2012) (arguing that "tort law is likely to be the first areas of law impacted by the
neuroscience revolution"); Joshua D. Greene, Beyond Point-and-Shoot Morality: Why Cognitive

(Neuro)ScienceMattersfor Ethics, 124 ETHICS 695, 696 (2015) (describing the implications cognitive
science can have on ethics); Adam J. Kolber, Will There Be a Neurolaw Revolution?, 89 IND. L. J. 807,
808 (2014) (stating that there will be a neurolaw revolution due to new brain technologies); and Oliver
R. Goodenough & Michaela Tucker, Law and Cognitive Neuroscience, 6 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. SCi. 61,
63 (2010) (discussing the usefulness of intersections between law and neuroscience).
27

Christian

Nordqvist,

What

Is

Neuroscience?,

MED.

NEWS

TODAY,

http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/248680.php [https://perma.cc/2HXV- X7S3] (last updated
Sept. 26, 2014) (defining neuroscience).
28
See
SCALABLE
BRAIN
ATLAS,
https://scalablebrainatlas.incforg/main/index.php
[https://perma.cc/JME5-GFRA] (displaying neuroanatomical maps through a "fully web-based display
engine").
29

The Brain and Its Functions, NEUROLOGYCHANNEL,

http://thebrainlabs.com/brain.shtml

[https://perma.cc/Q3KD-VXH3] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
"0 See Maria de la lglesia-Vaya et al., Brain Connections - Resting State jMRI Functional
Connectivity, in NOVEL FRONTIERS OF ADVANCED NEUROIMAGING 51, 52-54 (Kostas N. Fountas ed.,

2013),
http://www.intechopen.com/books/novel-frontiers-of-advanced-neuroimaging/brainconnections-resting-state-fmri-functional-connectivity [https://perma.cc/TP7B-FWEZ] (describing the
ways in which "exploring the neuroanatomy of the brain and the underlying connectivity of different
functional areas [allow us to attain] new insights on the organization of the human brain.").
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Today, many researchers rely on functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging (fMRI) brain scans to test and study cognitive processes and
behavior, such as how moving your finger to scroll through an app on your
iPhone activates certain parts of your brain.132 Studies utilizing fMRI
provide evidence showing that anatomically distinct regions of the brain do
more work during different types of reasoning.133 For example, neural
components accompany common decision-making biases such as framing
effects.1 34 The field of such research highlights the complexity of our brains
while also discrediting commonly held but erroneous ideas, such as the "left
brain" or "right brain" idea."3
Such complexities make applying neuroscience data to legal questions
and writing about them in a compelling way risky. Lawyers like detail and
precision. Legal scholarship likes to announce clear, bold claims and
contributions. Research in neuroscience is different.' 36 It is cautious and
"' Id. at 54 fig. 1 ("Diffusion Tensor Tractography (left), graph of connectivity (center), functional

connectivity (right)). This figure is modified from Patric Hamann et al., Mapping the StructuralCore of
Human
Cerebral
Cortex,
PLOS
BIOLOGY
(July
1,
2008),
[https://perma.cc/B85Dhttp://joumals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/joumal.pbio.0060159
ZBKV].
132 See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA ET AL., COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 110, 152-58 (3d ed. 2011).
(discussing how fMRI works, comparing it to PET scans, and discussing the reasons behind its popularity
as a mechanism for scientists).
133 See Vinod Goel et al., Disassociationof Mechanisms Underlying Syllogistic Reasoning, 12

NEUROIMAGE 504, 512-13 (2000) (using an event-related tMRI study of syllogistic reasoning using
sentences with and without semantic content and finding that the left-temporal system was recruited
during content-based reasoning, but when performing the same reasoning task without semantic content,

the parietal system was recruited).
14

Joshua A. Weller et al., Neural Correlatesof Adaptive Decision Making for Risky Gains and

Losses, 18 PSYCHOL. SC. 958, 958-64 (2007).
135 Interview with R. McKell Carston, supra note 30 ("There is no evidence of a strong bilateral

bias in brain functioning. Language may prove an exception as it is left lateralized with subtle bias effects.
Social processing occurs more frequently on the right side of the brain but the left side is still engaged,

albeit minimally.").
136 See, e.g., Oshin Vartanian & David R. Mandel, Introduction, in THE NEUROSCIENCE OF
DECISION MAKING 1, 3 (Oshin Vartanian & David R. Mandel eds., 2011) ("We endeavor to show that
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findings are specific to the particulars of the study. Because of this, legal
scholars must be careful not to over-claim. Responsible use of the data
requires seeking multiple verifications that confirm a central insight. This is
the approach applied here.
B.

The Neuroscience ofDecision Making

The field of neuroscience today is excited by evolving research about
how biological data informs knowledge of cognitive functions implicated in
decision making.1 37 In this context, decision making is understood to be the
cognitive mechanisms that work to help a person select good from bad
options.1 3 8 Certain topics are considered to be theoretically relevant to
decision making and enjoy a significant body of knowledge in
neuroscience.' 39 These include trust, cooperation, uncertainty, reward, and
loss.' 40 Scientists have found that certain hormones stimulate certain
functions. Oxytocin, for example, increases a person's sense of trust due to
this neural connection.141 This can result in a person having a strong
affiliation with their group, leading to altruism toward those within it and,
notably, an increased harm for out-group members.1 42 Cognitive functioning
in decision making has been tested through a variety of means including
"behavioral
experiments,
brain
imaging,
neuropsychology,
electrophysiology, computational modeling, and investigations of
neurotransmitter systems." 4 3 Through these varied methodologies,
scientists can measure neural networks and systems in addition to neural
functions.1 44 Through these studies, the following central insights emerge.

current behavioral and neural evidence supports the assertion that the field has entered a stage in which
context-dependence of choice must be seen as central to decision theory and as something that cannot be
ignored without incurring a severe loss of explanatory completeness.").
37

Id. at 1.

138Antoine Bechara, Human Emotions in DecisionMaking: Are They Usefi or Disruptive?, in THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING, supra note 136, at 73, 74, 76 ("This mechanism for selecting

good from bad options is referred to as decision making, and the physiological changes occurring in
association with the behavior selection constitute part of somatic states (or somatic signals).").
"3 Vartanian & Mandel, supra note 136, at 2.
'" See, e.g., Michael Kosfeld et al., Oxytocin Increases Trust in Humans, NATURE, June 2, 2005,

at 673, 673-75.
1' Id.
142 See Interview with R. McKell Carston, supra note 30 ("[T]he exact mechanism of action on a

broad functional level is not known.").

1i4 Vartanian & Mandel, supra note 136, at 2.
'" John P. O'Doherty & Peter Bossaerts, Towarda Mechanistic UnderstandingoflHuman Decision
Making: Contributions of Functional Neuroimaging, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC., 119,
119-23 (2008); Brian Knutson et al., Distributed Neural Representation of Expected Value, 25 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 4806, 4806 (2005).
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Multiple Systems of Thought

The idea that human thought is complex and invokes multiple systems
in our brain has been popularized by author and psychologist Daniel
Kahneman who describes two systems of human thought.' 45 System 1
operates quickly and automatically to make intuitive choices.14 6 System 2,
useful for focusing on complex choices, is slower, analytical and driven by
reason.' 47 Kahneman's explanation of human thought reflects modem
understandings in psychology about human behavior.
In recent years, neuroscientists have added to these understandings in
important ways. They are able to monitor which parts of the brain become
active during different types of activity and thought. This type of data, often
drawn from fMRI studies, updates the theory. There is no unitary process in
the brain for making decisions.' 4 8 Instead, when our brains engage in
decision making, they invoke multiple systems often in sequence or at the
same time to engage in judgment and choice. Cognitive functions that
develop decisions occur at the same time as those that inform emotions and
interactions between the two influence the choices one makes.1 4 9 The
existence of multiple systems of thought in the brain defies traditional logic
that we can make decisions using only logic and reason. These findings
demonstrate the complexity of cognitive processes involved in decision
making.
2.

The Role of Thought in Cognition

Decision making often occurs with the explicit aim of achieving a preset goal. When faced with making an important decision, we try to focus on
the objective and stay on task. From a neuroscience perspective, this activity
is called goal-directed thought.' When we engage in it we are utilizing our
pre-frontal cortex, which optimizes its ability to focus attention on relevant
stimuli, and this is a process called cognitive control."' In a crude sense,

145 DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLow 21-23 (2011).

'4 d at 20-21.
147 Id at 20-21; see also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by
Representativeness, in JUDGEMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman

.

et al. eds., 1982), at 85-98; Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping
Bounded Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 697, 698-99 (2003) ("The operations of System I are typically
fast, automatic, effortless, associative, implicit . . . . The operations of System 2 are slower, serial,
effortful, more likely to be consciously monitored and deliberately controlled. .
148 Vartanian & Mandel, supra note 136, at 2.

1' See, e.g., Antoine Bechara et al., Different Contributions of the Human Amygdala and
Ventromedial PrefrontalCortex to Decision-Making, 19 J. NEUROSCI. 5473, 5473 (1999) (discussing

how the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala affect different processes).
"' Kalina Christoff et al., The Role of Spontaneous Thought in Human Cognition, in THE
NEUROSCIENCE OF DECISION MAKING, supra note 136, at 261. This Section takes its title from

Christoff's work.
' Id. at 261-63.
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focusing on making a decision helps our brains reduce the influence of
distracting stimuli.
However, as is true with most findings in neuroscience, the story about
thought and the brain is more complex. Who hasn't had their mind wander
during a meeting, no matter its importance? Understanding why this happens
requires inquiring about what happens inside the brain. Known as
spontaneous thought, our brains tend to prefer the "default network"15 2 when
we are not engaging in attention-demanding activities. Many of us
experience this network as our thoughts drift right before we fall asleep at
night. One possible benefit of such de-focused thought is its potential for
maximizing memory consolidation due to the brain's increased capacity to
access long-term memories during spontaneous thought.'
A third category, creative thought, is believed to activate processes in
the prefrontal cortex, the "default network," and memory networks. 54
Studies about creative thought work to identify how to improve creative
problem-solving capacity. For example, in a 2005 study, people solved
anagrams more quickly when they were lying down than when they were
standing.15 In another study from 2002, people who were awoken from
REM sleep were better able to solve anagrams than those awoken from nonREM sleep.' As such studies evolve, so do the applicable findings.
However, there is enough evidence to suggest that creative problem-solving
and goal-directed decision making recruit different brain processes and
regions.' 57 Asking people to do both at the same time may not be
recommended. Furthermore, the prescription for optimal decision making
just might mean more naps and more daydreaming. Recognizing the various
types of thought from a neurological perspective allows for a deeper
appreciation of how memory, emotion, motivation, and other factors work
in complex and diverse ways to influence decision making.

152 Id. at 263 (attributing the findings of the brain's "default network" to Marcus
E. Raichle et al.,
A DefaultMode of Brain Function, 98 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. U.S. 676 (2001)).
1' Id. at 264 ("These findings suggest that long-term memory processes contribute strongly to the
phenomenon of spontaneous thought ... memory consolidation may be one of the main functions of
spontaneous thought.").
1 Id ("Divergent thinking tasks produce decreased beat range synchrony and increased alpha
range synchrony over the frontal cortex providing evidence for loosened cognitive control and lower
prefrontal cortical arousal during creative thought.").
..Id at 264-65 (attributing the study by D.M. Lipnicki & D.G. Byrne, Thinking on Your Back:
Solving Anagrams Faster When Supine Than When Standing, 24 COGNITIVE BRAIN REs. 719 (2005)).
'-' Id at 265 (attributing the study of REM sleep versus non-REM sleep to M. P. Walker et al.,
Cognitive Flexibility Across the Sleep-Wake Cycle: REM-sleep Enhancement of Anagram Problem
Solving, 14 COGNITIVE BRAIN REs. 317 (2002)).

157

d
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Empathy and MirrorNeurons

8
Empathy is a cognitive skill essential for pro-social behavior."
However, as a term, empathy describes many responses, not just one. It
identifies related but distinct phenomena of cognitive capacities and
behavior that occur when a person responds with "sensitive care" to
another's suffering.' 59 Varied responses that demonstrate this capacity
include coming to know what someone else is feeling internally, feeling
60
what he or she feels, and/or matching another's neural responses.'
Evolutionary biologists have shown that this cognitive capacity developed
in our species over millions of years.'"' In the field of neuroscience, empathy
research has only taken off with significance in the last decade. However,
this research is shedding new light on old ideas by showing, for example,
that there seems to be a distinction between empathy and personal distress
at the neurological level.' 62 In other words, our brains process pain we see
another experiencing quite differently from pain we undergo ourselves. An
important recent study has shown that empathy is not an automatic or
63
One
inherent reaction but a cognitive skill that requires deliberation.'
potential implication of this is that empathy may be something that must be
taught because it is skill acquired by learning.
Research on empathy attempts to understand why, as a matter of
cognitive functioning, the observations and indications found in behavioral
studies might be occurring. As previously described, the brain has many
pathways for processing choices, risk, judgment, and decisions. So the
question from a neuroscience perspective is what cognitive processes are
activated when a person experiences empathy.
Advances in brain mapping have led to the ability to map the
"physiological correlates of the process of empathy, describe its neuronal

"'C. Daniel Batson, These Things CalledEmpathy: EightRelated but Distinct Phenomena, in JEAN
DECETY & WILLIAM ICKES, THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY 3, 4-11 (2009) (discussing how
to define empathy and identifying "eight distinct phenomena that have been called empathy.").
15 In other words, there is no single controlling definition of empathy from a neuroscientific
perspective. See id. at 3-15 (describing eight concepts for understanding the phenomenon of one person's

caring response to another's suffering).

" Id. at 3-5.
...See Frans de Waal, The Evolution of Empathy, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY (Sept. 1, 2005),

http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/theevolution of empathy [https://perma.cc/HY22-8G3E]
(reporting that empathy was critical to survival as a species and summarizing studies performed on
animals and other mammals).

162 THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 158, at viii.
' Anjali Krishnan et al., Somatic and Vicarious Painare Represented by DissociableMultivariate

Brain Patterns, 5 ELIFE 1, 3 (2016), http://elifesciences.org/content/5/el5166-download.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JQ6S-ZCBU]; see Empathy for Others' Pain Rooted in Cognition Rather Than
Sensation,

CU-Boulder Study

Finds,

UNIV.

OF

COLO.

BOULDER

(June

14,

2016),

http://www.colorado.edu/today/2016/06/14/empathy-others-pain-rooted-cognition-rather-sensation-cuboulder-study-finds [https://perma.cc/4STX-HD39] ("The research suggests that empathy is a
deliberative process that requires taking another person's perspective rather than being an instinctive,
automatic process.").
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architecture[,] and specify empathy circuits in the brain."l One of the
conclusions of this research has centered on the function and importance of
mirror neurons. The Mirror Neuron System ("MNS") was first theorized in
1996 by studying the neural activity in the brains of macaque monkeys.1 65
Canonical neurons link one's perception with action.1 6 6 Mirror neurons
activate when you watch another person engage in an act.1 67 It is thought
these two neural circuits account (at least in part) for the cognitive capacity
for empathy. 6 8
Studying these brain functions has also led to widespread recognition in
social psychology, sociology, neuroscience, and other fields of the
phenomenon of emotional contagion, where people literally catch each
other's feelings.1 69 This is true for touch, sound, and emotion.' 70 The centers
of neural activity linked to empathy include the right inferior parietal lobe
(found to process our capacity to identify with others) and the anterior
cingulate cortex, insula, thalamus, and somatosensory cortices (which
process emotion).' 7 ' When your mirror neurons fire, your brain activates
different areas depending on whether you take a first-person or a thirdperson perspective.172 Marco lacaboni, a professor of psychiatry at UCLA,
has pioneered work on mirror neurons that indicates that identity factors
such as age and race can change how neurons function.'
How does empathy, as variously defined, play a role in decision
making? Although the question is straightforward, the answer is not.
Psychologists have sought to understand the link through behavioral studies.
One study showed that parents who more frequently reported feeling distress
in response to a crying infant as opposed to feeling sympathy or compassion

6' Jeanna C. Watson & Leslie S. Greenberg, Empathetic Resonance: A NeurosciencePerspective,
in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY, supra note 158, at 126; see also Katherine P. Rankin et al.,
Structural Anatomy of Empathy in Neurodegenerative Disease, 129 BRAIN 2945, 2945-47 (2006)

(summarizing research study to determine the degree to which regional differences in the brain volumes
correspond to real-life empathic behavior).
1' Watson & Greenberg, supra note 164, at 187 (citations omitted). The existence of the MNS in
humans is debatable and has not been confirmed at this time.
&

'" PERSPECTIVES ON IMITATION: FROM NEUROSCIENCE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE 3 (Susan Hurley

Nick Chater eds., 2005).
16' David Dobbs, How Babies Know What You're Up to (or Not), SCL AM. (Nov. 26, 2007),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/news-blog/how-babies-know-what-youre-up-to-or/
[https://perma.cc/4RCV-NNEP].
' Marco lacoboni, UnderstandingOthers: Imitation, Language and Empathy, in PERSPECTIVES
ON IMITATION: FROM NEUROSCIENCE TO SOCIAL SCIENCE, supra note 166, at 77-101.
...
For a survey of this research, see ELAINE HATFIELD ET AL., EMOTIONAL CONTAGION 1-7 (1994)

(discussing emotional contagion and its effects on social and developmental psychology).
17o Watson & Greenberg, supra note 164, at 126.
.' Argye E. Hillis, Inability to Empathize: Brain Lesions That DisruptSharing and Understanding

Another's Emotions, 137 BRAIN 981, 983-84, 986 (2014).
172 Watson & Greenberg, supra note 164, at 127.
173 Elizabeth A. Reynolds Losin et al., Race Modulates Neural Activity During Imitation, 59

NEUROIMAGE 3594, 3594-95 (2012).
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had a high risk of abusing a child. Another study found that husbands who
were violent to their wives had a significantly lower capacity for what is
called "empathy accuracy," or, the ability read other people's feelings and
thoughts accurately."17 A third study on emotional contagion indicated that
what you feel is influenced by nonverbal cues of those around you, whereas
what you think others are feeling is heavily influenced by what they have
said. 1

6

'

The state of the existing research on empathy and contagion shows that
being aware of what someone thinks and what they feel provides two
essential but distinct means for gaining information about the expressive
behaviors of people around us.17 7 Studies are tracking two separate but
connected processes for how the brain processes empathy. The first
experience, sharing, occurs when you experience another's pain experience,
which may produce an array of emotional responses ranging from empathy
to disengagement. 178 The second, mentalizing, occurs when, after reflecting
upon another's pain experience, one chooses an empathetic response.1 79 The
cognition of empathy may be best understood as a system of flexible
conceptual representations that translate thought into feelings.'s
There is also neurological evidence that individuals differ in their capacity
for empathy.' 8
Although the study of empathy remains ongoing, two early implications
emerge. First, empathy involves cognitive processes and brain structures that
are also invoked during different kinds of decision making.' 82 Thus, to
believe that empathy is irrelevant to decision making is erroneous and
..
4Joel S.

Miner et al., Empathic Responsiveness and Affective Reactivity to Infant Stimuli in High-

and Low-Riskfor Physical ChildAbuse Mothers, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 767, 767-68, 776 (1995).
"' Kahni Clements et al., Empathic Accuracy of Intimate Partners in Violent Versus Nonviolent
Relationships, 14 PERS. RELATIONSHIPs 369, 370-71 (2007).
71 Christopher K. Hsee et al., Assessments of the Emotional States of Others: Conscious Judgments
Versus Emotional Contagion, 11 J. Soc. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL., 119-21 (1992).
" See Ullrich Wagner et al., The Relationship Between Trait Empathy and Memory Formation for
Social vs. Non-Social Information, 7 BMC PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2015) (clarifying the distinction between
cognitive empathy where one mentally represents another's thoughts, and affective empathy where one
aligns with another's emotional state).
"'See, e.g., Paula M. Neidenthal, Embodying Emotion, 316 SCL 1102, 1104 (2007) (explaining a
study that examined the brain activity of a participant watching another participant experience pain in an
attempt to prove that an individual can feel another's emotions).
' Jamil Zaki et al., The Neural Bases ofEmpathic Accuracy, 106 PNAS 11382, 11384 (2009).
180 Wagner et al., supra note 177, at 1; see also Clifford B. Saper, The Central Autonomic Nervous
System: Conscious Visceral Perception and Autonomic Pattern Generation, 25 ANN. REV. OF
NEUROSCIENCE 433, 453-61 (2002) (describing patterns of autonomic responses in the central nervous
system); Kevin A. Keay & Richard Bandler, Parallel Circuits Mediating Distinct Emotional Coping
Reactions to Different Types ofStress, 25 NEUROSICENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 669, 669 (2001)
(establishing that emotional coping strategies to different types of stress arise through distinct,
longitudinal neuronal columns of the midbrain periaqueductal gray (PAG) region).
"' Watson & Greenberg, supra note 164, at 126.
182 Samuel M. McClure et al., Conflict Monitoring Cognition-Emotion Competition, in HANDBOOK
OF EMOTION REGULATION 204, 205 (James J. Gross ed., 2007).
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problematic. Second, empathy is learned, not innate.1 As such, decision
makers and institutions ought to consider how it can be best developed. We
should value the importance of how empathy is developed as a cognitive
skill and how its involvement in brain functions is invoked during decision
making. Learning how to empathize can be done through visualization
techniques used to help a person actively imagine another's experience or
by mimicking the facial expressions of another. Decentering is another
technique that can increase one's capacity for becoming aware of what
another is experiencing.
4. Emotion
I saved a complex and, for purposes of this Article, highly relevant
aspect of cognition for last. Emotion plays an incredibly important role in
decision making.' 84 To discount it as either normatively undesirable or
descriptively irrelevant is not only erroneous but dangerous. However,
writing about what neuroscientific evidence says about the role emotion
plays in decision making is tricky; neuroscientists have numerous ongoing
debates about emotion and few agreements. A second clarification is that
analysis of emotion in cognitive functioning involves analysis of the topics
previously described. That said, let us begin.
It was long thought by neuroscientists and psychologists that emotion
could be described categorically."' Today you feel happy. Tomorrow you
may feel sad. But neuroscientists have begun to think about emotion
differently.' 8 6 Instead of categories, the prevailing approach describes
emotion as high or low arousal, which correlates with a negative or positive
valance. These approaches seek to inform a query-what does it mean for
one person to consider the emotional state of another person?
The study of emotion is central to this Article's exploration of
understanding decision making through a cognitive perspective.' 87 Studies
about the neurobiology of emotion are complex and have lagged behind
other studies of mind and brain. But there is data to support the following
claims that "decision making is a process critically dependent on neural
systems important for the processing of emotions[,] conscious knowledge
alone is not sufficient for making advantageous decisions[,] and ... emotion
is not always beneficial to decision making[;] [s]ometimes it can be

&

a See Wagner et al., supra note 177, at 7 (refuting earlier studies arguing empathy is innate); see,
e.g, Jean Decety & Philip L. Jackson, The Functional Architecture of Human Empathy, 3 BEHAV.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE REVIEWs 71, 73-75 (2004) (proposing empathy as an "innate ability to
recognize that the self and the other can be the same").

'` See McClure et al., supra note 182, at 222 (concluding that there are at least three types of
decision making where emotions discernibly influence behavior).
8.

See HATFIELD ET AL., supra note 169, at 3 (proposing that emotions may be categorized such as

in a hierarchy).
" Interview with R. McKell Carston, supranote 30.
'7 Bechara, supra note 138, at 73-74.

COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN EXECUTIVE-BRANCH DECISION MAKING

2017]

749

disruptive."' How, then, does emotion influence our decision making? This
Article does not endeavor to answer such a complex question. Rather, it aims
to illuminate the central insight that emotion is connected to decision making
in important ways worthy of further analysis.
Appropriate decision making, in the cognitive sense, involves a dynamic
interplay between intellect and emotion. Studies show how disruption to one
capacity negatively affects the other. The somatic marker hypothesis, for
example, provides neurobiological support for the notion that people make
judgments by evaluating consequences and the probability of them
occurring, and sometimes, at a gut or emotional level.' 89 Emotion intersects
with memory, judgment, and other cognitive functions in ways that are
beneficial and detrimental to decision making.
The foundational study underpinning this hypothesis found that patients
with normal intellect who suffered from trauma to their frontal lobes
demonstrate abnormalities in emotion and feeling as well as in decision
making.190 Patients often decided against their self-interests and were unable
to learn from previous mistakes."' The study concluded that such patients
had mostly intact neuropsychological tests but were compromised in their
abilities regarding expression of emotion and feeling.' 92 Without functioning
emotional signals, a person had to rely on cost-benefit analysis for
determining conflicting choices, which takes the brain more time to do.' 93
So what evidence exists to support a claim that emotions guide
decisions? A first set of studies supports the notion that decision-making
impairments are linked to a failure in a person's somatic (emotional)
signaling.' 9 4 A subsequent group of studies support the notion that decision
making is guided by emotional signals (gut signals) that are generated in
anticipation of future events. An additional study found that emotional
1

Id. at 74.

'9 Antonio R. Damasio, The Somatic Marker Hypothesis and the Possible Functions of the
PrefrontalCortex, 351 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SC. 1413, 1413 (1996); George Loewenstein
& Jennifer S. Lerner, The Role ofAffect in DecisionMaking, HANDBOOK AFFECTIVE SCL 619, 619-20

(2003); Norbert Schwartz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of Well-Being:
Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 513
(1983); R.B. Zajonc, On the Primacy ofAffect, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 117, 122 (1984).
1" Bechara, supra note 138, at 75-77. This led to Damasio's 1994 somatic marker hypothesis,
which posits that "the neural basis of the decision-making impairment characteristics of patients with
VM prefrontal lobe damage is defective activation of somatic states (emotional signals) that attach value

to given options and scenarios." Id. at 77.
1' GARY G. BERNTSON & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, HANDBOOK OF NEUROSCIENCE FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 751 (2009) ("The choices they make are no longer advantageous-the patients

often decide against their best interests-and are remarkably different from the kinds of choices they
were known to make in the pre-morbid period. They are unable to learn from previous mistakes. . . .").
92 Bechara, supra note 138, at 75 ("As noted, the patients have normal intellect, as measured by a

variety of conventional neuropsychological tests . . . .").
...
Vartanian & Mandel, supra note 136, at 76 ("Deprived of these emotional signals, patients must

rely on a slow cost-benefit analysis of various conflicting options.").
194 Id at 77-80 (describing a series of studies investigating links between emotion and decision
making. The first study was conducted by Bechara, Tranel, and Damasio in 1996).
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signals need not be perceived consciously for them to impact decision
making.195 These and other studies provide strong support for the concept
that activation of parts of the brain that process emotion-such as the
amygdala and the Ventro-medial prefontal cortex-help people make more
rational decisions.' 96 Just as addicts or psychopaths are aware of the
consequences of their actions but go ahead with their choices, disassociation
at the neurological level can lead to the same result.
Fear is a strong emotion that has been shown to play an important role
in cognition and decision making.' 97 Imagine that you are afraid of snakes.
When you encounter a real snake, your brain processes this as a primary
inducer in the amygdala. But if you worried about encountering a snake or
see an image of a snake in a movie, this is processed as a secondary inducer
in your Ventral Medial Pre-frontal (VM) cortex.' 98 The VM cortex works to
couple knowledge about what something will feel like with real
experiences.199 In contrast, the amygdala triggers emotions from the actual
cause of a fear inducer, 20 0 such as seeing something that appears to be a
snake moving through tall grass. The amygdala works to connect aspects of
a representation or an object with one's emotions about its presence. 20 1 if
someone's amygdala is not functioning properly, the connection between
associations of loss and choice development becomes disrupted.202 As a
result, a person may fail to avoid behaviors that lead to repeat negative
emotions, such as losing money at a casino. 2 03 The core insight is this: if a
person has an underlying neurobiological abnormality, they are likely to
have behaviors that demonstrate repeated and persistent failure to learn from
previous mistakes. 204 This is not a person who should be in charge of making
decisions that affect our nation.

'" Id. (referencing a second study conducted by Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio in 1997).
' Id. at 86 ("[T]he results provide strong support for the notion that decisionmaking is guided by
emotional signaling (or somatic states) generated in anticipation of future events. Without the ability to
generate these emotional/somatic signals, the patients fail to avoid the [choices] that lead to painful
losses.").
9 Bechara, supra note 138, at 73-95.

See id at 87-89 (explaining that the VM cortex "couples knowledge to representations of 'what

it feels like' to be in certain situations").
" See id. at 88 (explaining how the VM prefrontal cortex couples information to emotional
representations, with one function serving as a "trigger structure for somatic/emotional states from
secondary inducers").
2 See id. at 85 ("The function of the amygdala is to couple the features of the object with its
emotional attribute. For example, a snake is simply an object with certain features. However, this object

is linked to some emotional attribute such as fear. . . .").
201
202

203

See id. at 86 (explaining that the amygdala embraces the "fight or flight" response).
See id. (explaining that when the amygdala is damaged, the patient can no longer signal pain).
See id ("[B]oth emotional parts of the brain, the amygdala and the VM cortex, help people make

rational decisions.").
204 See id at 91 (explaining the effects that neurobiological disabilities have on one's ability to learn
from mistakes).
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Neuroscience proves that our brains engage in a complex interplay of
functions when we make a choice or a decision and that emotion is a
component of this. Yet people often want to know if emotions are "bad" for
decision making. There is no single answer to that question. Context matters.
The brain often experiences conflict between activating its emotionprocessing networks and activating its reasoning-processing networks.20 5
This helps to explain why people who experience high emotion-anger or
joy-make different choices than they would otherwise make. But the oftrepeated notion that wise decisions are made with cool (unemotional) heads
is inaccurate.
The somatic marker hypothesis also holds that certain emotion is
integral to a particular decision making task.20 6 Emotion that is related to
what you are deciding can benefit your decision-making cognition.207
Emotion that is unrelated can become a distraction. 208 A hypothetical that
illustrates this has you driving a car on the highway. Imagine you have to
decide whether or not to speed on the highway to make it to your final exam
and the "thought" of being late or getting in an accident will evoke an
emotional response (likely fear) that is related to your decision making.
However, learning that your loved one died while driving may be disruptive.
This distinction does not always hold. Sometimes integrally related
emotions can be disruptive too. 209
One implication from emotion research that is critical to this Article is
that any attempt to influence decision and choice must account for the role
that emotion plays in cognition. Assuming emotion away is an error that
ignores the evidence. Second, judgments about morality or fairness
implicate the role of emotion in ways that other sorts of decisions do not.
This suggests that awareness of cognitive functioning in these situations
bears great importance.
III. BARRIERS TO CHANGE

Just like the rest of us, those chosen to make important decisions in the
executive branch are subject to the brain behaviors described above. Yet, as
Section I questioned, we have a thin framework for analyzing who is most
qualified to decide. As Section II explored, decision making involves many
cognitive processes that deal with information and emotion. Decision
makers are influenced not only by the task before them but also by a host of
internal factors that involve their perceptions and biases. But such

205
2

06

207

208
2

d
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76-77.
Id.
There are many studies exploring the relationship between emotion and decision making. See,

e.g., Baba Shiv et al., The Dark Side of Emotion in Decision-Making: When Individualswith Decreased
EmotionalReactions Make More Advantageous Decisions, 23 COGNITIVE BRAIN RESEARCH 85 (2005).
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neuroscientific understandings of decision making have not yet been
adopted as factors in determining who gets to decide. In other words,
Presidents and their chiefs of staff have no requirement that a person they
seek to appoint or select into a high rank executive-branch position must be
cognitively competent to serve in the role. This section investigates potential
reasons for this. It considers three institutional cultural norms that have been
historically prominent as metrics of competence: rationality, meritocracy,
and exceptionalism. These ideals have shaped legal thinking in ways that
persist and, as I further argue, are inconsistent with neuroscientific evidence
about how our brains decide.
A. The Seduction of Rationality in the American Legal Tradition
Law is enamored of rationality.2"o The competent decision maker has
long been thought to be a rational one. Law students may first encounter this
concept in their torts class when they read about Justice Learned Hand's
famous "reasonable person."2 1' The reasonable person is a legal fiction, one
that adopts a certain view of rationality in human decision making. It is an
anthropomorphic representation of the duty of care applied by courts in tort
and contract and perpetuated through case law. One influence of this view
was to disdain behavior that was viewed to be emotional because the law is
equivocally "uncomfortable with feelings."212 Those engaged in its practice,
from judges to lawyers, are taught to do so by suppressing intense emotion
under the long-standing rationale that it clouds reason and good judgment.
This influence on American legal thought is derived from the European
legal traditions the American legal system was founded upon.2 13 Three
schools of thought dominated the early formations of American law:
naturalism, positivism, and historicism. Naturalism, a legal philosophy
rooted in natural law, understands law in relation to immutable moral
principles and inherent rights.2 14 Positivism made a definitive move to
210 Richard A. Posner, Emotion Versus Emotionalism in Law, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 309-10
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (confirming this traditional view that "[t]he law itself is conventionally

regarded as a bastion of 'reason' conceived of as the antithesis of emotion, as operating to rein in the
emotionality of the behavior that gives rise to legal disputes" and countering that the dichotomy is

misleading based on the cognitive theory of emotion).
211 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 738, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1932); see also United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (applying a normative test that adheres to a commitment
to cost efficiency); Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323, 323
(2012) (arguing that "[o]nly normative definitions are logically acceptable."). But see Osborne v.
Montgomery, 234 N.W. 372, 375 (Wis. 1931) (applying a standard of reasonableness in a tort case based
on what "the great mass of mankind" would do in a similar circumstance).
212 Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes and the PassionsofJustice, in THE PASSIONS
OF LAW,

supra note 210, at 330.
213 JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 1870-1970, at 8 (1990) ("American legal theory
started as an European transplant .... .").
214 RICHARD A. COSGROVE, SCHOLARS OF THE LAW: ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE FROM BLACKSTONE

TO HART 30 (1996) (quoting William Blackstone: "'This law of nature, being coeval with mankind and
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distance law from morality. Proponents of this expository paradigm (Henry
Terry, Wesley Hohfeld, Hans Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart) advocated various
means of isolating law from morality in order to sterilize judicial and other
forms of legal decision making.215 Historicism understood law through its
evolution in society and its institutions.2 16 Drawing upon these earlier
European traditions, American law developed from the late nineteenth
century through the beginning of the Second World War with the pursuit of
establishing law as "academically worthy."21 7 As such, emotion was not to
be involved in thinking about law.
English philosopher John Locke's views help explain why. He espoused
that humans are endowed by God with a "faculty of reason." 218 In Locke's
view, people are both aware of their self-interests and are motivated by such
in decision making. This foundational concept prevailed in economic
rational-choice theory that, in turn, influenced theories about government
decision making. 2 19 Max Weber declared that the modern state is the
"rational state" based on "rational law." 220 Work by international relations
scholars like Thomas Schelling, among others, solidified this view in
understanding international strategy.22 ' The classic example is the Prisoner's
Dilemma in game theory, which provides a paradigm for predicting the
future behavior of two actors based on self-interest, cooperation, and failure
to cooperate. 2 22 This framework assumes that humans operate as rational
actors motivated by reason and self-interest. Certain international law
scholars use this frame to reject ideas that nations obey international law for
any other reason than their own national interests. 223 The rational-actor view

dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding all over the globe,
in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this."').
215 HERGET, supra note 213, at 3-4.
216
Id. at 22-23 (including the works of Scottish theorists David Hume, Adam Smith, John Millar,
Mandeville, German scholars Gustav Hug and Friedrich Carl von Savigny, and English
Bernard
and
theorists Herbert Spence and Henry Maine).
217 Id. at 1-2. Dean of Harvard Law School Christopher Columbus Langdell reformed the study of
law by turning it into a field of scientific inquiry and endowing the study of law in American law schools
with the case method that prevails today. Id at 34.
2..

JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 10 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980).

219 See GRAHAM ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 28-29

(1971) (identifying the "anthropomorphic fallacy" in policy analysis that assumes the government
produces decisions as a unitary, rational thinker).
22o MAX WEBER, WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE 289-90 (1923).
221 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 3-5 (1980) (discussing how the

theory of strategy assumes rationality when analyzing government actions); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 405-

06 (1989) (applying the rational choice theory to deductively explain state action in international
relations).
222 WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA 8-9 (1992)

(explaining generally the

Prisoner's Dilemma).
223 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (2005)

(arguing that nations should follow international law regardless of their interest in doing so); JOEL P.
TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (2008) (acknowledging that a
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of the world has had significant and long-standing influence over law,
economics, international relations, and other fields.
The problem with the views of rationality that law has adopted is that
they are inaccurate.22 4 Research from evolutionary biology, behavioral
economics, and social psychology demonstrates that people make choices
that counter their rational self-interests 22 5 and problematic behaviors can be
predicted.226 We humans are not the rational actors we were previously
thought to be.
Take the problem of positive illusions in behavioral psychology, which
shows that people are primed to be systematically biased in positive ways. 22 7
We use more positive words than negative in our daily vocabulary.2 28 We
recall positive memories more readily than negative ones.229 We tend to be
overly optimistic about the future. 230 We also are more likely to evaluate
ourselves more positively than others, 23 1 and we tend to presume that when
we love something (like a movie or a song) that others will too. Another
well-established bias occurs as overconfidence, or overestimating one's
knowledge. 23 2 If you see a relationship between two things that does not
really exist, you are making an illusory correlation.23 3 Status quo bias shows
that we tend to prefer an option framed as the status quo. 234 There is also a
set of biases that relate to information. Anchoring, for example, shows up as
the tendency to rely too heavily on the first information presented when
making a decision.
rational state would abandon a treaty if its benefit from doing so was greater than its benefit from
adherence).
224 Herek et al., supra note 22, at 204 (explaining why rational choice theory is descriptively and
normatively inadequate for improving the quality of decisions); see Amos Tverskey & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS
AND BIASES, supra note 147, at 3 (explaining that the processes that individuals use to make decisions
can sometimes lead to "severe and systematic errors").
225 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, LibertarianPaternalismIs Not an Oxymoron, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1167-70 (2003) (providing evidence that humans will commonly make decisions
contrary to their own interests).
226 OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN
CONSUMER MARKETS 2 (2012); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, PHISHING FOR
PHOOLS: THE ECONOMICS OF MANIPULATION AND DECEPTION 6-7 (2015) (explaining how marketers
use well known psychological principles to encourage customers to make purchases contrary to their best

interests).
227 JOHNSON, supra note 25, at 6 (describing adaptive overconfidence as a "widespread human
trait.").
228

id

229 Id
230
231
232

233

id
id
See id at 6 (providing positive and negative examples of overconfidence).
Illusory

Correlation,

BLACKWELL

ENCYCLOPEDIA

SOC.

PSYCHOLOGY,

http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9780631202899_chunk g978063120289911
ssl-3#citation (last visited Dec. 3, 2016).
234 Rob Henderson, How Powerful Is Status Quo Bias, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/after-service/201609/how-powerful-is-status-quo-bias
[https://permacc/2L2Y-8234].
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Another set of deviations from rationality are heuristics, which are
cognitive strategies or mental shortcuts we use in the face of complex or
incomplete information to make decision making easier.235 Stereotyping, for
example, is an adaptive trait we have evolved to process information quickly
even though our determinations based on stereotypes are often inaccurate
and deeply flawed. Herbert Simon introduced the term "satisficing" to
describe the ways our minds process judgments that are "good enough." 23 6
His insight was that although rational people intend to be rational, we often
lack the information necessary to make a rationally optimal choice. 2 37
Both cognitive biases and heuristics can contribute to judgment errors
and other decision-making pathologies. People may also choose to avoid
making any decision in uncertain circumstances. 2 38 For some legal scholars,
these insights led to prescriptions about how to improve individual decision
making and normative arguments about whether law ought to do so. Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler's work on choice architecture, aimed at altering
one's external decision environment to encourage or "nudge" a person
toward better choices, is a central example of this.2 39
Just as individuals make poor choices, so do groups. However,
understanding how and why proves to be complex. Political scientists,
international relations scholars, and psychologists have long considered
multiple theories to explain and to address the phenomena of poor choices.
In Irving Janis' oft-cited book Groupthink, he uses cognitive psychology to
explain how the process of foreign-policy decision making can be deeply
flawed, leading to equally flawed outcomes.240 Such decision errors can lead
to irrational behavior.241 One example is the Hobbesian Trap, which
provides theoretical explanation for why President John F. Kennedy and
Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev both chose to escalate toward
preemptive nuclear strikes to eliminate the threat they thought the other
posed during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 24 2 The theory is that the human
235 Kahneman, supra note 145, at 79-88 (describing heuristics as a "machine for jumping to
conclusions" that lead to overconfidence, framing effects, base-rate neglect and other cognitive biases).

236 HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 204-05 (1957); see also Shelley E.
Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social PerceptionandInteraction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 147, at 190-91 (explaining the meaning of"satisfice").
237

See SIMON, supranote 236, at 256 (explaining the difference in rational decision-making ability

between the "economic man" and a "choosing individual of limited knowledge and ability").
238 See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional

Design, 9 INT'L J. CONST. L. 636, 639 (2011) ("When the stakes are high, there is naturally some
reluctance to making the wrong decision too early; when stakes are low but the probability of error is
high, deferral also makes sense as a strategy.").
239 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 24, at 8.
24o

JANIS, supra note 25, at 13 (explaining how poor decision-making processes can lead to

"groupthink" and result in irrational decisions).
241

Id.

242 See Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, The Hobbesian Trap, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

THE ECONOMICS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT 93-96, 106-07 (Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergious Skaperdas

eds., 2012) (describing the Hobbesian Trap as caused by a "fear spiral" that will promote the inclination
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response to fear, not rational-based thought, drove the impulse to strike
preemptively. 24 3
In the group context, decision errors such as these occur for various
psychological reasons and due to failures in process where no one questions
underlying assumptions or offers dissent. 2 " The group takes on a life bigger
than that of any one of the individuals and group cohesion becomes valued
more than accurate information or quality of analysis. 245 Ultimately, the
group feels good about its decision even when cognitive biases are clearly
present (and often because cognitive biases are present).246 Rationality, as
such, has little to do with it.
B. The Illusion of Meritocracy
Meritocracy is a system of governance where those who are "talented"
(variously defined) are chosen to advance based on achievement.247 This
cultural belief has roots in our nation's immigrant past. Many who came to
America in the eighteenth century and beyond were enamored of a country
where merit might permit them to get ahead, a feat largely impossible in the
rigid aristocratic societies in Europe they were escaping. 248 A country
founded on merit held a promise that people could succeed not on their
family name, but on their personal abilities and efforts. There was a cultural
shift from a world based on aristocracy to one based on meritocracy, which
valued hard work over birthright.
This early foundational principle found its way into government policy
and practice over time. The prevailing "spoils system" was abandoned after
the assassination of President James A. Garfield.249 In 1871, with the
creation of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, and in 1883, with the passing
for a decision maker to engage in "hawkish" behavior such as preemptive strikes without a "dominant

strategy dove" to offset the behavior).

243 Id. at 106. ("Since actions are strategic complements, a contagion of fear
causes even peaceful

types to behave aggressively.").
2
" See MARK SCHAFER & ScoTT CRICHLOW, GROUPTHINK VS. HIGH QUALITY DECISION MAKING
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5-6 (2010) (summarizing Irvin Janis' research regarding the reasons for

failure in foreign-policy decision making).
245

246
247

Id. at 6.

Id at 6.
Meritocracy,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER,

http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meritocracy

[https://perma-cc/26Z3-U5BV] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016); see also Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of
Meritocracy, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 5, 2015), http://chronicle.com/articlefThe-Tyranny-ofMeritocracy/1 50983/ [https://perma.cc/K7CP-BYAQ] (last visited Dec. 3, 2016) (attributing the term to
British sociologist Michael Dunlap Young who coined the term in his 1958 satire The Rise of
Meritocracy).
248

For a description of the concept of merit in early America see JOSEPH F. KETT, MERIT: THE

HISTORY OF A FOUNDING IDEAL FROM THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
4 (2012) ("In America, then, merit became the property not of revolutionary outsiders but of
revolutionary insiders.").
249
Pendleton
Civil
Service
Act,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,

https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pendleton-Civil-Service-Act
visited Dec. 3, 2016).

[https://perma.cc/AT2P-KPF5]

(last
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of the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, the executive branch adopted
new hiring practices based on the idea of merit. 25 0
Faith in meritocracy prevails in America. Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben Bernanke describes meritocracy as a "bedrock American principle ...
the idea that all individuals should have the opportunity to succeed on the
basis of their own effort, skill, and ingenuity."2 5 1 In a Pew Poll, 69% of
Americans agreed that "people are rewarded for intelligence and skill." 2 52
Most Americans believe this notion to be true for themselves. 253 So it is

natural for us to apply the same belief to those in government.
However, meritocracy is a cautious friend.254 What constitutes merit in
one person's view differs greatly from another's on the basis of cognitive
bias, as discussed in Section II. But what constitutes merit for a particular
government post? Absent a well-developed standard of what merit means
for a specific position in our government, this subjectivity allows the
President to appoint whom he likes and justify such decisions with the
sanction of approval that derives from the premise of merit. Meritocracy also
prevents diversity for reasons that cognitive studies reveal. 255 Like attracts
like. People tend to hire those they find to be like themselves. Stereotypes
inform estimations of competency. Gone awry, meritocracy becomes a cover
Id
Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Before the Greater Omaha Chamber of Commerce,
Omaha, Nebraska: The Level and Distribution of Economic Well-Being (Feb. 6, 2007),
[https://perma.cc/PM6Khttp://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke20070206a.htm
EVJB].
250
251

252 ISABEL V. SAWHILL & JOHN E. MORTON, ECONOMIC MOBILITY: IS THE AMERICAN DREAM

at
https://www.brookings.edu/wp(available
2
(2007)
WELL?
AND
ALIVE
content/uploads/2016/06/05useconomicsmorton.pdf [https://perma.cc/NAV5-TVAL]).
253 See Ronald Brownstein, America, The (Jacksonian)Meritocracy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2009),

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/03/america-the-jacksonian-meritocracy/1486/
[https://perma.cc/S695-UJNPR] ("As the pollsters wrote in a memo summarizing the results, 'Despite the

economic downturn ... the notion that America is a meritocracy where individuals can apply themselves
and move ahead continues to endure. Most Americans, including those on the bottom rung of the income
ladder, believe their own economic mobility is within their control and remain optimistic about their
ability ... to get ahead."').
2

See Eric Luis Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, ConstructedCriteria:Redefining Merit to Justify

Discrimination, 16 PSYCHOL. SC. 474, 474 (2005) (finding that decision makers often set merit-based
criteria for jobs in ways "congenial to the idiosyncratic credentials of individual applicants from desired
groups"); see also David Dunning et al., A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving Theories
of Success a Product of Motivational Forces?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58, 58 (1995)

(examining how people frequently define merit in ways that are consistent with their own credentials);
Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistryand Social CategoryBias, 87 3. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817,

821 (2004) (providing evidence of discriminatory hiring and admissions decisions justified by meritbased criteria); Uhlmann & Cohen, supra, at 476 ("When considering an educated, media-savvy family
man, participants inflated the importance of those qualities to success at the job. But when considering a
male applicant who lacked these qualities, they devalued them. No such favoritism was extended to the
female applicant.").
255 See, e.g., Shana Lebowitz, 3 Unconscious Biases that Affect Whether You Get Hired, Bus.

INSIDER (July 17, 2015, 11:47 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/unconscious-biases-in-hiringdecisions-2015-7 [https://perma.cc/RG3B-7GXX] (discussing the ways that inherent biases can affect
determinations of merit).
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up for elitism, which limits its claim to being simply a calculation of talent
and hard work.
C.

The Culture ofExceptionalism

British journalist Walter Bagehot famously described the state of
exceptionalism that prevailed in nineteenth-century British governance:
"The trained official hates the rude, untrained public. He thinks that they are
stupid, ignorant, and restless . . . .
His view expresses the very real
tension that arises between the citizenry and government officials who see
themselves as exceptionally well-positioned, due to information, experience,
or other factors, to make decisions of national importance on behalf of what
they consider an uninformed public. This approach is particularly salient in
the context of national security, where information does not flow to the
public due to its classified status. Presidents have long asserted the need for
exceptional power, authority, and even secrecy in matters of foreign affairs
and national security. Alexander Hamilton tied the rationale for broad
executive power to the threat of war, stating that "the circumstances that
endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the
care of it is committed."257 This rationale was used to justify heightened
power in the executive branch as necessary to "insure domestic Tranquility
and provide for the common Defence."2 58
Legal scholars have described a part of this influence as one of "foreign
relations exceptionalism" that courts have promulgated for almost a
century.259 Exceptionalism results from the federal government's differential
256

WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 194-95 (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.,

Ist ed., 1894).
2.. THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 115 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison
agreed that it would be "vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 207 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
258 "[U]nder the doctrine of enumerated powers you must go to the Constitution
to find a special

warrant for the things that are necessary to be done, but ... under the doctrine of a plenary inherent war
power, you resort to the Constitution only to find out if there is definite language which forbids the things
necessary to be done. The doctrine of inherent powers, in other words, makes constitutionally available
all of the resident forces of the United States as a national community in the waging of war." EDWARD
S. CORWIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS 161 (1976).
259 See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REV.

735, 760 (2014) (discussing foreign relations exceptionalism); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1106-31 (2009) (describing national security law cases
where the executive branch was exempt from legal constraints); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American
Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (1999) (defining foreign relations exceptionalism
as the idea that the federal government's foreign affairs powers are subject to different constitutional

restraints than those that regulate its domestic powers); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and
American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 461 (1998) (defining the approach of foreign affairs
exceptionalism); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 117 (1990) ('This

simple, three-part combination of executive initiative, congressional acquiescence, and judicial tolerance
explains why the president almost invariably wins in foreign affairs.");Archibald Cox, Executive
Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (1973) (providing a historical Supreme Court overview of
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treatment of foreign relations affairs (inclusive of national security) from

domestic matters. 26 0 The idea, as expressed in Justice Sutherland's opinion
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,261 is based on the
presumption that the President has exceptional knowledge of "the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries" due to institutional resources. 2 62 Thus,
Justice Sutherland opined, "[s]ecrecy ... may be highly necessary" to avoid
embarrassment.263
For many years in this country, the Supreme Court has, in effect, given
deference to the President's authority to decide certain matters in the realm
of foreign affairs, national security, and intelligence. This has been
particularly so during times of war. During World War 11, for example,
President Roosevelt decided, via executive order, to try eight Nazisponsored saboteurs before an ad hoc military commission instead of in the
regular courts on the grounds that military officials were better suited than a
jury composed of civilians to appreciate the dangers such spies posed to the
security of the United States.264 In the landmark case Exparte Quirin,265 the
Supreme Court, in a per curium order, upheld the commission's jurisdiction
and the eight saboteurs were convicted and sentenced to death.2 66 Such
approaches continued during the Cold War. In UnitedStates v. Nixon,267 the
Court articulated doctrinal exceptionalism by suggesting that it would treat
claims of executive privilege differently and more deferentially when they

executive privilege taking into account the supervening decision of the Court in United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683 (1974)); For work adopting a functionalist view of exceptionalism, see Garrick B. Pursley,
Dormancy, 100 GEO. L. J. 497, 560(2012) (describing the different critiques and views of foreign affairs
exceptionalism); Daniel Abebe & Eric A. Posner, The Flaws ofForeignAffairs Legalism, 51 VA. J. INT'L
L. 507, 509 (2011) (noting the history and development of executive primacy); Eric A. Posner & Cass
R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L. J. 1170, 1202 (2007) (stating that
deference to the executive in foreign relations is based on functional considerations); Julian Ku & John
Yoo, Beyond Formalismin ForeignAffairs: A FunctionalApproach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 Sup.

CT. REV. 153, 155 (2004) (recognizing the functional superiority of the President in managing foreign
affairs); Jide Nzelibe, The UniquenessofForeignAffairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941,944 (2004) (arguing that
questions of foreign affairs are treated differently than other constitutional questions).
2" See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the ConstitutionalRegime of Foreign Relations,

85 VA. L. REV. 1, 4 (1999) (stating the difference between foreign and state affairs).
261 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
262 Id. at 320.
263

Id.
See Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaningand Implications of the
Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 63-65 (1980) (detailing President Roosevelt's reasoning for the
26

decision to try the saboteurs in the military commission).
265 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
26 G. Edward White, Felix Frankfurter's "Soliloquy" in Ex Parte Quirn, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 423,
425-26 (2002) (detailing how President Roosevelt's order creating the commission provided that review
of its decisions would be solely by the President); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (affirming that Mr. Korematsu's failure to follow the military order constituted a crime and
opining that while the curtailment of the civil rights of one racial group was immediately suspect and
subject to strict scrutiny it was not automatically unconstitutional as "public necessity may sometimes

justify the existence for such restrictions").
267 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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involve "military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets."268
These doctrines were used by the executive branch to advance constitutional
authority for enhanced presidential powers.2 69 During the years following
September 11, 2001, however, the Supreme Court constrained Presidential
authority in foreign affairs relating to the fight against terrorism 270 and, now,
some scholars believe we are entering an era where foreign-relations
exceptionalism is waning. 271
This history of how exceptionalism has influenced ideas about
executive-branch decision making illustrates a point central to this Article:
there is still a prevailing view that the best decision makers are those with
access to special knowledge. We often believe that more information leads
to better choices. But this view is overly simplistic. It fails to account for the
ways that people discount information due to bias or other decision-making
pathologies. In doing so, subjective assumptions, for example about who is
a suspected terrorist or what behaviors constitute a national security threat,
become more acceptable.272
In this way doctrinal exceptionalism can give rise to institutional
exceptionalism in the workplace based on cultural norms about who is best
suited to decide. In some offices, the person who works the hardest and has
dark circles under her eyes to show it is believed to be the most
knowledgeable. Yet, we know that sleep deprivation changes the way the
brain functions and often impairs key cognitive capacities, such as memory
268
269

Id. at 706.
See, e.g., 8 U.S. OP. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 101, 116 (1984) (documenting DOJ reliance on the

Court's Nixon dicta).
270 For a recent case where the Supreme Court constrained Presidential expansion and
exceptionalism, see, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 (2006) (noting the majority opinion

of Justice Stevens). The Court's opinion rejected the choices of the Bush Administration in this matter

and found that they violated U.S. treaty obligations to uphold Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions. Id. at 625-26; CONVENTION (ll) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR:
CONFLICTS NOT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER: ART. III, INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

(Aug. 12, 1949), https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590006 [https://perma.cc/TG2A-6LNU]
(requiring that taking out judgment not pronounced by a regularly constituted court is prohibited against
persons taking no active part in the hostilities in a conflict not of an international character); see also
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,. 542 U.S. 507, 544-45 (2004) (recognizing the government's authority to detain
enemy combatants even ifthey are U.S. citizens, but-the Court found that citizens are entitled due process
rights and U.S. courts are entitled to review such rights); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,484 (2004) (finding
that federal courts have jurisdiction to take up challenges by detained foreign nationals held at
Guantanamo).
271 See, e.g., Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law,

128 HARv. L. REV. 1897 (2015) (offering a theory of the definition of exceptionalism and arguing that
exceptionalism is waning as foreign relations is becoming less exceptional).
272

Hamdan, 548 U.S.

at 635 ( "We have assumed, moreover, the truth of the message implicit in

that charge . . . that Hamdan is a dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would cause great
harm and even death to innocent civilians, and who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportunity.
... [l]n undertaking to try Hamdan and subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to
comply with the rule of law that prevails in this jurisdiction."). Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni citizen,
was in Afghanistan working for Osama bin Laden, first on an agricultural project and later as a chauffeur
and bodyguard. Id at 570. In 2002, Mr. Hamdan was detained and imprisoned at Guantanamo but was
not formally charged with conspiracy to commit terrorism until 2004, two years later. Id at 566.

2017]

COGNITIVE COMPETENCE IN EXECUTIVE-BRANCH DECISION MAKING

761

27 3

and attention, needed for effective decision making. In other workplace
cultures, the person with special access to the President or his close advisers
is presumed to be the one who should decide based on the notion that the
President has somehow delegated his decision-making authority to the
person with whom he has a closer relationship. But there is nothing from a
neuroscientific perspective to suggest that such a metric indicates good
decision-making skills. We could critique many other ways that people are
chosen, explicitly or implicitly, to make decisions. The reality is that we
have long substituted unproved criteria as metrics for determining who
decides in the executive branch. Now, thanks to emerging science about our
brains, we do not have to rely solely on these traditional views.
IV. TOWARD A COGNITIVE VIEW OF DECISION-MAKING COMPETENCE

A. Deepen UnderstandingsAbout Executive-Branch DecisionMaking
In the twenty-first century we can no longer afford to presume that
certain institutions or the people who work within them are exempt from the
realities of being human. Among these are the realities about how brains
work, how we process information, the ways in which we make choices and
more. Thus, efforts to improve governance in the executive branch and
beyond rely, at least in part, on increasing awareness about how people
decide. This Article has endeavored to introduce a neuroscientific view of
decision making to the context of choices made by top officials in the
executive branch. I have sought to persuade readers that employing
neuroscience to study cognitive competence in government decision making
will illuminate understandings about how good choices, and therefore good
governance, occurs. The task of future work is to determine how such
information ought best to inform law, policy, and institutional design. Here,
I outline some initial thoughts regarding the work that lies ahead.
The first task is to identify how to update understandings about decision
making. Doing so requires getting people who study the brain and decision
making together with people working on institutional and organizational
reform. One can imagine various possibilities. The President could create an
interagency working group calling for an ongoing study. Alternatively, the
President can issue an Executive Order calling for the investigation of how
neuroscience can better inform who should be selected for executive-branch
posts and how to improve decision making institutionally and individually.
Both strategies have been employed before. 274
273 Paula Alhola and Paivi Polo-Kantola, Sleep Deprivation: Impact on Cognitive Performance, 3
NEUROPSYCHIATRY Dis TREAT 553 (2007).
274 See, e.g., The White House National Science and Technology Council Interagency Working
at
(available
2014)
21,
(Feb.
Neuroscience
on
Group
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/acceleratingneuroscienceresear
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The second task is to determine if and how new information ought to
inform change and reform. One specific proposal is to update the practices
for selecting political appointees. The Senate could, for example, implement
a procedural measure during the appointments confirmation process to
consider cognitive criteria alongside education and other markers of
competence for potential appointees. In doing so, they would commit to
follow a practice of considering such criteria during the deliberations they
already hold when considering an appointment. Another possibility would
be for agency leaders in the civil service or at the Senior Executive Service
level to initiate a joint study across the executive branch to identify criteria
that measures cognitive competence. These criteria could be included in the
formal employment requirements needed for promotion to senior positions.
A third challenge is to integrate neuroscientifically driven reform
proposals with other views about reform. In this regard, scholarship in
administrative law and constitutional law offer important reform ideas.275
The query shared by all is how to effect change. Some scholars locate such
responsibility with the President and her or his delegates.276 Others assume,
as Tom Ridge did, that "Congressional leaders would reorganize."277
Proposals for reorganizing executive-branch agencies also locate change
within an institution by putting a particular person in charge.2 78 These
proposals share a common denominator-good governance requires
cognitively competent people capable of making good decisions. In that
spirit, this Article has sought to highlight an area often forgotten among such
reform efforts-the importance of hiring and appointing competent
ch - feb 2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VW5-YKZB]);Press Release, The White House, Executive
Order-Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People (Sept. 15, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-behavioral-scienceinsights-better-serve-american [https://perma.cc/98GE-T6SX] (discussing Executive Order to promote
the application of behavioral science insights with regard to policy development and other executive
branch tasks).
275 It is beyond the scope of this Article, but an important focus for future work will be to intersect
neuroscience research with the rich discourse in administrative law and constitutional law regarding
decision making and institutional design. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., AdministrativeLaw in a Global
Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L.
REv. 1101 (1988) (recalling the Reagan administration's approach to deregulation as a way of decreasing
government and analyzing the interplay between administrative and constitutional law in this context);
Michael Dorf Legal Indeterminacy and InstitutionalDesign, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875 (2003) (advocating
for a return to legal process theory to better understand institutions and their design); David A. Super,
Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1375 (2011) (analyzing the optimal timing of government
decision making during crises and disasters and arguing against taking a reflexive approach to flexible
decision making).
276 See, e.g., Ingber, supranote 14, at 109 ("Internal checks are only as strong as the expertise and
cultural norms of the personnel or institutions making decisions."); Rascoff supranote 15, at 640 (2016)
("sound institutional design.... call[s] for a mixture of centralized review based in the White House and
greater numbers of political appointments. . . in the intelligence agencies").
277
Steven
Brill,
Is
America
Any
Safer?,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/09/are-we-any-safer/492761/
[https://perma.cc/MU9D-JXX2].
278 Id (describing how Chip Fulghum, Department of Homeland Security's chief financial officer,
was hired as a part of a "cleanup operation" after 9/11 for the Department).
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executive-branch officials.
Information is powerful, but it is not always enough to change deepseated institutional cultures and norms. One cognitively competent person is
not enough to combat systemic biases that prevail in government and in law.
Deep reform must also seek to destabilize faulty and problematic notions
that permeate the culture of various agencies and units within the executive
branch (e.g., emotions make a person weak, being strong on security means
not having empathy for the enemy, working so hard you lose sleep is a sign
of how important you are). This Article offers a starting point, while
acknowledging that much work remains.
B. Seek Reform at the IndividualLevel
This Article has introduced a new way of analyzing decision making at
the individual level within the executive branch to expand definitional
understandings about competence in executive-branch decision making.
Who should decide matters of national importance ought to be informed by
how decision making, however varied and complex, takes place in our
brains. We must look at the personal attributes of individuals more closely
and with more evidentiary rigor.
Basic guidelines that will generally improve cognitive capacities are
straightforward. Get enough sleep. Do not be exceptionally stressed for a
long, consistent period of time. But other insights are not as well understood.
Functional mirror neurons invoke cognitive capacities, like memory, that
enhance reasoning. 279 Emotional numbing does not work; instead, emotions
will influence how one's brain operates in varied ways, sometimes positively
and in other times negatively. 2 so Prescriptions are nuanced and not
straightforward, but if an official wants to improve his or her decisionmaking competencies, neuroscience can provide valuable guidance.
This Article has presented information about how individuals make
decisions and the cognitive processes our brain use to do so. It has shown
why mental inputs such as empathy and emotion can influence these
processes. This section aims to illustrate how such information might alter
and better inform future understandings about how executive-branch
officials make decisions by appreciating how people, as individuals, decide.
To do so, I present two hypothetical decision moments and analyze them
through a cognitive frame. This is a creative enterprise that aims to ask
questions, not definitively answer them, in order to expand our collective
understanding as legal scholars about what executive-branch decision
making entails.
279 See Ralph Adolphs, Cognitive Neuroscience of Human Social Behaviour, 4 NATURE REVIEWS:

NEUROSCIENCE 165, 168 (2003) (discussing how the processing of perceptual information "can influence
memory, attention, decision making and other cognitive functions").
21 See Vartanian and Mandel supra note 136, at 90-91 ("The somatic marker hypothesis concerns
emotion that is integral to the decision-making task at hand.").
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It is worth reiterating the constraints of doing so, previously described
infra in the Introduction and Section II.A. For example, a neuroscientific
study based on an fMRI provides findings specific to that particular study.
A study illuminating the complexity of how empathy intersects with other
cognitive processes associated with decision making in the brain in order to
assert that empathy matters to decision making does not implicitly aim to
ascribe value-that empathy is good or bad-in its implication.
Extrapolation of those findings does not provide the certainty or definitive
assertions common among law review articles. Yet, such caution is the
methodologically responsible approach and the one followed here.
1.

Planfor the CrisisBrain

During times of emergency, decision-making competence is vital. As
Cicero long ago observed, "when arms speak, the laws are silent."2 8' This
may occur for various reasons. In some cases, decision makers ignore or
reinterpret the substantive law. In other cases, the law simply provides no
guidance because the context is sufficiently new and different that the law
does not neatly apply. Not surprisingly, the lack of legal clarity or
applicability does not prevent decisions from being made. In a crisis,
decision makers act and questions about the legality of their actions are
retrospective.
The problem that has arisen in the years since September 11, 2001 is that
the context of crisis has become perpetual. Although the Constitution does
not formally provide the President with so-called emergency powers,
Presidents have taken them. 2 82 In this environment, traditional procedurallegal constraints and influences on the choices that government decision
makers take may fail. Constitutionally derived separation of powers aims to
involve Congress in presidential decision making that will have a paramount
effect on the nation, such as decisions about whether or not to go to war.283
But when practical necessities demand that a choice be made quickly, many
believe that the President has implicit authority to make such choices.284
281

14 MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO IN TWENTY-EIGHT VOLUMES
16-17 (N. A. Watts trans.,

1979) ("[S]ilent enim leges inter arma," which translates, "When arms speak, the laws are silent").
282 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (discussing the Constitution's Take Care clause and the unenumerated powers that are

understood to flow from it).
283 See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2012) (declaring the purpose of the resolution
is to insure that both the President and Congress shall apply their "collective judgment" on decisions of
going to war).
284 The series of cases vital to this question derive from the Second World War and the Korean War
and show the commonly held view in favor of expanding presidential authority during wartime. See
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing the concept of the unenumerated powers of the presidency
and how the executive bianch has expanded powers during wartime that it would not have in times of
peace); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (holding that the risks of espionage
and sabotage were severe enough to allow the President to exclude anyone of Japanese ancestry from the
war area on the west coast). But see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732-33 (2007) (holding that the
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The conditions for necessity vary. Crisis, however, has a long history of
prompting changes in decision-making authority. As Cicero wrote at the end
of the Roman Republic, "[e]veryone of standing had realized that the
republic's rule of law and order had given place to the rule of the
stronger."28 5 Necessity was certainly the rationale given for the many
changes, or "crash efforts," that occurred after the attacks on September 11,
2001.286 New threats were thought to require fast and decisive decisions. Yet
decision making driven by crisis and necessity is often deeply flawed. After
9/11, various government agencies and actors reacted at the cost of an
estimated one trillion dollars. 28 7 As a Government Accountability Office
auditor explains, "[i]f you're shocked and scared and you know there's a
threat out there, you'll do anything, spend anything, to deal with it ... even
if what you spend it on hasn't been tested and you haven't even set any
standards to evaluate it." 28 8 U.S. Representative of Arizona Martha McSally
described the culture at the time, saying, "[w]e rolled something out in a
panic after 9/11 and then it lingered in a substandard place because attention
shifted."28 9
Since the reality of many decision-making environments is one of crisis,
those tapped to decide ought to prepare for such. Neuroscience offers
important implications for how brains proceed under stress. Consider, as an
illustrative example, the killing of Osama bin Laden. On the afternoon of
May 1, 2011, President Barack Obama was in the White House Situation
Room with his national security team watching live video feed (with audio
narrated by CIA Director Leon Panetta) showing an aerial view of the U.S.
Navy SEALs operation to kill Osama bin Laden in his compound near
Abbottabad, Pakistan.29 0 The President, acting as commander-in-chief, had
given final authorization for the operation two mornings prior.29 1 His
President may not suspend habeas corpus in the detention of enemy combatants); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (concluding that the President cannot convene a military commission that
violates the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542
U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that the President does not have the wartime authority to hold a United
States citizen as an enemy combatant without review of the detention before a "neutral decisionmaker").
285 JANET COLEMAN, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT: FROM ANCIENT GREECE TO EARLY
CHRISTIANITY 274 (2000).
21 See Brill, supra note 277 (using the term to describe the fast changes that occurred in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 including reconstituting the air-marshals program, doubling the number of
Border Patrol agents, creating and passing through Congress a Victim Compensation Fund in a record
of the Transportation Security Authority (TSA)).
ten days,
287 and the creation

Id

288

Id.

289 See id. (referencing Congress's creation of BioWatch, a biodefense monitoring program

developed after the anthrax attacks in September 2001 under the Bush administration).
2

" Jamie Crawford, The bin Laden Situation Room Revisited-One Year Later, CNN (May 1, 2012,

2:00 AM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/01/the-bin-laden-situation-room-revisited-one-yearlater/ [https://perma.cc/JC8Z-MJT6]; CNN Wire Staff, How U.S ForcesKilled Osama bin Laden, CNN
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/
GMT),
11:59
2011,
3,
(May
bin.laden.raid/index.html [https://perma.cc/7K9K-6RQD].
"' CNN Wire Staff, supra note 290.
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authorization was influenced by determinations that the operation was
legally permissible.29 2 However, he made certain choices in real-time during
the operation itself-including, purportedly, the decision not to bomb the
compound.2 93
How might such visual input from the live video feed have influenced
the President's decision-making process from a neurological perspective?
Imagine that the President had not slept well the night before, making his
prefrontal cortex more vulnerable to stress.294 The release of stress
hormones, such as cortisol, transforms cells in the hippocampus, which
inhibits new learning.295 Now imagine that the President empathized with
the soldiers' own feelings of distress, triggering the President's mirror
neurons.2 96 His brain could process the threat to their security as a threat to
his security. Such a threat can remand a person's thinking back to old neural
pathways triggering System I thinking.2 9 7 For example, an fMRI study
revealed that when a brain faces a conflict between a belief and logic
(executive functions) the brain changes its reasoning process and recruits the
right prefrontal cortex, which affords emotions-notably anger, fear, and
empathy-a stronger role in decision making. 298 The experience of fear can
also stimulate more careful deliberative processes than normal because it
links decision making with our working memory and emotion systems. 299
The purpose of this example is to show that no individual is unaffected
by her neurological processes, not even the President. This Article calls for
understanding such complexities and working toward developing best
practices that account for them. Due to the enormous importance and impact
of decisions that a President makes, this type of data should inform
institutional practices surrounding presidential decision making. In other
words, a President could plan for his crisis brain by exploring factors that
both inhibit and enhance his cognitive capacities during crisis-based
292 The Obama Administration relied upon the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against
Terrorists Act (authorizing the President to use "necessary and appropriate force") in this operation. See
Speech by Stephen W. Presten, The Legal Framework for the United States' Use of Military Force Since
9/11 (Apr. 10, 2015) (transcript available at http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/SpeechView/Article/606662 [https://perma.cc/DFW8-PBA2]) (discussing the use of this and subsequent
Congressional authority in direct U.S. military engagement with al'Qaida).
293 The CNN Wire Staff, supra note 290.
294 See supra Section IV.B (discussing functions and responses of the
prefrontal cortex).
295 Christopher Bergland, Chronic Stress Can Damage Brain Structure
and Connectivity,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-athletesway/201402/chronic-stress-can-damage-brain-structure-and-connectivity
[https://permacc/T87C-

93HX].

See supraSection II.B.3 (discussing the theorized function of mirror neurons).
See supraSection II.B.1 (discussing System I and System 2 thinking).
29 George F. Lowenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267-81 (2001).
299 For early groundbreaking work in this area, see ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR:
EMOTION, REASON AND THE HUMAN BRAIN (1994) (demonstrating that emotions play a significant role
in social cognition and in decision making). For more recent work on the topic, see Antonio Damasio
Gil B. Carvalho, The Nature of Feelings: Evolutionary and Neurobiological Origins, 14 NATURE
REVIEWS: NEUROSCIENCE 143, 143-50 (2013) (examining the evolutionary and neurobiological origins
of feelings).
29

&
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decision making.
2. Empathize with the Enemy?
Many people assume that protecting national security is a laudable aim
and that, in opposition, those who threaten our nation and us are bad actors.
But where do these views come from and how might they impact the choices
one makes? Do key national-security decision makers empathize with the
Americans they are trying to protect? Do they demonize the enemy? And
where empathy is present or absent, how does it intersect with a person's
own emotions about a particular crisis or threat? From a neuroscientific
perspective, these questions matter for decision making. This is why.
Imagine you are a Department of Justice attorney-adviser and you have
to make a legal determination about whether or not the government's use of
drones (unmanned aerial vehicles) to target and kill a suspected terrorist in
a foreign country is legally permissible. How would you begin to decide that
question? As a matter of legal analysis, one might begin with the facts. Our
government has used drones to target and kill people since at least 2002.300
Today, such operations take place in at least four countries-Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia-with the purported consent of their
governments.3 01 Operations may be taking place covertly in other locations.
Because much of the information on drone use is classified, the exact data
on deaths and casualties is no more than an approximation. That said,
imagine you found and reviewed the data on the following chart.302
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Country
____________

Afghanistan
Pakistan
Somalia
Yemen

Estimated Drone Strike Deaths
Total U.S.
Drone Strikes
Total Killed
Ciilians
to DateKildileInud
48
420-619
14-42
421
2,476-3,989
423-965
15-19
25-108
0-5
107-127
492-725
65-101
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C
0-18
172-207
0
8-9

Injured
24-28
1,158-1,738
2-7
94-223

You might also consider the arguments for and against such strikes.
Targeted drone strikes can be beneficial because drones are capable of
accessing difficult mountainous terrain with little risk to U.S. military
personnel.303 However, drones cannot adequately distinguish between
targets and civilians, and their use may result in unintended violations of
international humanitarian law, such as the killing of child bystanders. If
such a tragedy occurs, it could strengthen a terrorist organization's power in
the region by incentivizing civilians to join driven by a desire for revenge.304
In making such legally derived decisions, you may attempt to isolate your
own feelings about drone strikes. You may find yourself empathizing with
potential victims of terrorism or with those targeted as suspected terrorists.
Such emotion and empathy would alter your cognitive functions and, in
doing so, would influence what choice you made. In this way, your legal
determination would be the product of more than law and facts.
The legal determination made by Harvard Law Professor David Barron
and Georgetown Law Professor Martin Lederman, who were then serving in
the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Council, was that the U.S.
government's use of drones to target and kill suspected terrorists was legally
permissible.305 Their memo argues that the nature of such targeted killing
was consistent with the principles of the laws of war permitting the killing
303
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of enemy forces, based on their interpretation that the acts described do not
violate federal law.3 0 6
Now imagine that your first insight into drone strikes came from reading
a news article about a sixth-grader named Mohammed Tuaiman.3 07 In it he
describes how he and the children in his Yemeni village have nightmares
about killing machines in the sky.30 He tells how his father and brother were
previously killed in 2011 by drones, and asks why the U.S. kills innocent
people.3 09 You then find out that on January 26, 2015, Mohammed died in a
drone strike.310 This type of fact-finding presents emotional factors in
addition to the numerical data of the chart previously included. A target
becomes a person. In response, what your mind does in reading this story is
critical to the cognitive functions your brain will employ in making a
decision about the legality of drone strikes. If you feel empathy for
Mohammed, your motor neurons will fire up, which activates other neural
processes. If you do not feel empathy and your motor neurons do not fire up,
you will employ other neural processes.
The lesson is this: we need to understand empathy if we are going to
understand decision making. Most people experience empathy for others at
some point in their lives. Where empathy is present, it often rewires the way
the brain processes other information. So, crudely put, empathy implicates
the way our brains make decisions and, in doing so, influences how we
decide. Yet, empathy is not on the national security agenda nor is it a part of
general approaches to talking about how important decisions are made in the
executive branch or in many other contexts. I argue here that it should be.
We ought to understand our own empathy or lack thereof when deciding
matters of national importance. The challenge that lies ahead and requires
engagement between scientists and government is to understand how
empathy works in a more nuanced way. It is too simplistic to preemptively
categorize whether the presence or lack of empathy is normatively good or
bad for effective decision making. But the science does support the basic
realization that the experience of empathy during decision making does
influence how cognition in the brain occurs. The point is that your decision,
while informed by legal analysis, is not devoid of other factors such as
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empathy and the emotions it provokes. To pretend otherwise is simply
inaccurate.
CONCLUSION

Humans make choices, and the choices we make are greatly influenced
by the ways our brains function. This Article has endeavored to demonstrate
that this information is valuable and essential to understanding how to
improve decision making in the context of executive-branch governance.
Emotion affects which parts of our brain fire up, which affects judgment and
choice. Empathy triggers one's mirror neurons. This descriptive deepening
of the concept of cognition in decision-making competence allows for a
more accurate understanding of how choices get made and how law should
better inform who gets to make them. It also holds persuasive power for
reform by demonstrating that officials charged with making decisions of
national importance are not excepted from the cognitive biases and functions
that affect us all. Meaningful governance will be achieved not only through
legal reform but also through reconstituting how our government and our
laws determine who is qualified to serve in top decision-making positions.
The difference between good and bad governance often comes down to the
people who are in charge. As such, who decides matters.

